Further Analysis on Public-Good Provision in a Repeated-Game Setting
Further Analysis on Public-Good Provision in a Repeated-Game Setting
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DOI：
10.1628/001522106x153400
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发表时间：
2006-09
期刊：
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Keisuke Kawachi;Hikaru Ogawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Keisuke Kawachi;Hikaru Ogawa
在一个重复博弈环境中私人提供公共产品的模型中，佩科里诺（1999）表明，在一个大型经济体中，不仅有可能保持合作，而且“容易”。私人提供公共物品的模式与具有公共物品提供溢出效应的区域间税收竞争模式密切相关。本文在一个无限重复的区际税收竞争互动模型中重新审视了Pecorino的论点。研究结果表明，在大型经济体中，当公共产品存在显著溢出时，触发策略支持有效税率，而当公共产品的利益溢出较少时，触发策略不支持有效税率。
In a model of privately provided public goods within a repeated-game setting, Pecorino (1999) shows that it is not only possible to maintain cooperation, but it is "easy" in a large economy. Models of privately provided public goods are closely related to interregional tax competition models with spillovers in public-good provision. This paper reexamines the argument of Pecorino in an infinitely repeated interaction model of interregional tax competition. The results show that in a large economy, while the trigger strategy supports the efficient tax rate if there exists substantial spillover of public goods, it fails to do so if there are few benefit spillovers.