Proving Erasure
Proving Erasure
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DOI：
10.1109/isit.2019.8849661
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Wolf
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xavier Coiteux;S. Wolf
似乎不可能证明远程托管服务不会泄露用户的数据-或者量子力学使之成为可能？我们调查，如果一个服务器托管数据可以信息理论上证明其明确删除使用“BB84样”协议。为此，我们首先严格引入加密隐私的替代方案：隐私委托。然后，我们将这个新的概念应用于可证明删除和远程数据存储。对于这两个任务，我们提出了一个协议，勾勒出它的部分安全性，并显示其脆弱性窃听攻击的目标只有几个比特。
It seems impossible to certify that a remote hosting service does not leak its users’ data — or does quantum mechanics make it possible? We investigate if a server hosting data can information-theoretically prove its definite deletion using a "BB84-like" protocol. To do so, we first rigorously introduce an alternative to privacy by encryption: privacy delegation. We then apply this novel concept to provable deletion and remote data storage. For both tasks, we present a protocol, sketch its partial security, and display its vulnerability to eavesdropping attacks targeting only a few bits.