Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare
Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare
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平叛战争中的说服与强制
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Birtle
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作者：
A. Birtle
有证据表明，”菲律宾战争结束时，战争部长埃利胡·鲁特（Elihu Root）说道，“叛乱的结束一方面是因为战争令人痛苦和无望，另一方面是因为和平具有吸引力。鲁特的评价适用于美国陆军在发动非正规战争方面的大部分经验。然而，对于说服和胁迫在叛乱和其他内部冲突中所起的作用，人们仍然很不清楚。在最近结束了关于美国陆军在发动反叛乱战争中的经验的两卷本研究中的第二卷之后，我想通过研究美国陆军在19世纪和20世纪参与的三场冲突来探讨武力和政治之间的关系：叛乱战争（美国内战，1861-1865），菲律宾战争（1899-1902）和越南战争（1954-1975）。起义战争亚伯拉罕林肯总统在着手击败南方反对美国政府的叛乱时，就明白了政治因素的重要性。在冲突的早期阶段，他制定了一条温和的路线，既为和解铺平了道路，又缓和了边境各州的舆论。他避免攻击南方的“特殊制度”（奴隶制），提供大赦，减刑，释放平民囚犯，并试图尽快恢复正常的公民生活。他的大多数指挥官都拥护这些政策，当他们不这样做时，他会谴责或取消他们。然而，林肯的温和态度未能说服南方人放下武器，随着时间的推移，总统接受了更严厉的措施来控制，如果必要的话，惩罚反叛的平民。他暂停了人身保护令，并强制宣誓效忠，而他的指挥官则重新安置人民，征收罚款，没收财产。威廉·T·少将谢尔曼是这种不那么宽容的做法的缩影。谢尔曼认为政府“不仅在与敌对的军队作战，而且在与敌对的人民作战”，因此决定政府“必须让老人和年轻人、富人和穷人都感受到战争的残酷。因此，他指示：“在军队不受骚扰的地区和街区，不允许破坏财产;但如果游击队或丛林杀手骚扰我们的游行，或者应该骚扰居民。. .否则，表现出当地的敌意，那么军队指挥官应该根据敌意的程度，下令并实施或多或少的无情破坏。“3毁灭，不是不分青红皂白的，而是针对不忠者的，目的是削弱叛军的战斗能力和意志。越来越多地使用集体惩罚措施并不意味着林肯已经放弃了温和。例如，在1863年，他公布了一个慷慨的程序，通过这个程序，反叛的州可以重新加入联邦。他还签署了第100号通令，即《美国陆军在战场上的政府指令》，其中提醒士兵们，“所有现代战争的最终目标是恢复和平状态”，“在公共战争中相互拿起武器的人并不因此而停止成为道德的人，对彼此和对上帝负责。“4该文件告诫士兵尊重平民的人身和财产权利以及他们的社会习俗和宗教信仰。它同样禁止肆意破坏，抢劫，残酷和酷刑。尽管如此，仁慈并不是单行道，如果公民拒绝和解之手，第100号一般命令允许指挥官采取严厉措施。其中规定对帮助敌人的平民的惩罚包括罚款、驱逐、迁移、监禁和死刑。这些命令还授权指挥官进行有计划的、成比例的报复;对那些不给任何宽恕的人不予宽恕;对游击队员、间谍和叛徒实施即决惩罚。在整个叛乱的其余部分，林肯继续挥舞着一只手诱导和惩罚在其他。…
IT IS EVIDENT," remarked secretary of War Elihu Root at the end of the Philippine War, "that the insurrection has been brought to an end both by making a war distressing and hopeless on the one hand and by making peace attractive."1 Root's appraisal holds true for much of the U.S. Army's experience in waging irregular wars. Nevertheless, there remains much confusion over the roles that persuasion and coercion play in rebellions and other internal conflicts. Having recently concluded the second in a two-volume study on the U.S. Army's experience in waging counterinsurgency warfare, I'd like to explore the relationship between force and politics by examining three conflicts that the United States Army was involved in during the 19th and 20th centuries: the War of the Rebellion (the U.S. Civil War, 1861-1865), the Philippine War (1899-1902), and the Vietnam War (1954-1975). The War of the Rebellion President Abraham Lincoln understood the importance of political factors when he set out to defeat the Southern rebellion against the U.S. government. During the early stages of the conflict, he charted a moderate course, both to pave the way for reconciliation and to mollify opinion in the Border States. He avoided attacking the South's "peculiar institution" (slavery), offered amnesty, commuted sentences, released civilian prisoners, and tried to restore normal civil life to occupied areas as soon as possible. Most of his commanders embraced these policies, and when they did not, he rebuked or removed them. Lincoln's moderation failed to persuade Southerners to lay down their arms, however, and over time the president accepted sterner measures to control and, if necessary, to punish rebellious civilians. He suspended habeas corpus and imposed loyalty oaths, while his commanders relocated people, levied fines, and confiscated property. Major General William T. Sherman epitomized this less tolerant approach. Believing that the government was "not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people," Sherman decided that it "must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war."2 He therefore directed that "in districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bush whackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants . . . otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of hostility."3 Devastation, not indiscriminate but directed at the disloyal, was meant to weaken the rebels' ability to fight as well as their will to do so. The growing use of collective punitive measures did not mean that Lincoln had abandoned moderation. In 1863, for example, he unveiled a generous process through which rebellious states could rejoin the Union. He likewise signed General Orders 100, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, which reminded Soldiers that "the ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace," and that "men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God."4 The document admonished Soldiers to respect the personal and property rights of civilians as well as their social customs and religious beliefs. It likewise forbade wanton destruction, looting, cruelty, and torture. Nevertheless, benevolence was not a one-way street, and should the citizenry spurn the hand of reconciliation, General Orders 100 permitted commanders to take stern measures. Among the punishments it prescribed for civilians who aided the enemy were fines, expulsion, relocation, imprisonment, and death. The orders also authorized commanders to use calculated and proportional retaliation; to deny quarter for those who gave none; and to dispense summary punishments to guerrillas, spies, and traitors. Throughout the remainder of the rebellion, Lincoln continued to wield inducements in one hand and punishments in the other. …