A game theoretic perspective on the management of shared North Sea fishery resources: Pre and post Brexit
A game theoretic perspective on the management of shared North Sea fishery resources: Pre and post Brexit
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DOI：
10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104669
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发表时间：
2021-07-08
期刊：
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Munro, Gordon R.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bjorndal, Trond;Munro, Gordon R.
自200海里专属经济区制度实行以来，北海沿岸国在管理共有种群方面进行了合作。挪威和欧盟通过1980年协定共同管理六个共有种群，该协定包括每年确定总可捕量配额、配额份额和准入协定。本文首先试图在博弈论的背景下解释为什么合作管理共享北海鱼类种群已经稳定了40多年。英国脱欧代表着对合作协议的冲击，现在有三方参与谈判。英国专属经济区不仅对英国渔民很重要，对挪威和欧盟27国也很重要。英国和欧盟已就包括渔业在内的贸易与合作协定达成一致，但挪威和英国尚未达成渔业协定。在文章的第二部分中，我们分析了英国-欧盟渔业协定，1980年协定的延续，以及英国和挪威之间未来的渔业关系。
Since the introduction of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime, North Sea coastal states have cooperated in the management of shared stocks. Norway and the EU have jointly managed six shared stocks through the 1980 Agreement which includes the annual setting of total allowable catch quotas (TACs), quota shares and access agreements. This article first attempts to explain in a game theoretic context why cooperative management of shared North Sea fish stocks has been stable for more than 40 years. Brexit represented a shock to the cooperative agreement, and there are now three parties to the negotiations. The UK EEZ is important not only for British fishermen, but also for Norway and the EU27. The UK and the EU have agreed on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement which includes fisheries, but Norway and the UK have not yet reached a fisheries agreement. In the second part of the article we analyse the UK-EU fisheries agreement, the continuation of the 1980 Agreement, and the future fisheries relationship between the UK and Norway.