Fang: a firewall analysis engine

Fang: a firewall analysis engine
复制标题

DOI:
10.1109/secpri.2000.848455
复制
发表时间:
2000-05
期刊:
Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Alain J. Mayer;A. Wool;Elisha Ziskind
Alain J. Mayer;A. Wool;Elisha Ziskind
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Alain J. Mayer;A. Wool;Elisha Ziskind

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

Today, even a moderately sized corporate intranet contains multiple firewalls and routers, which are all used to enforce various aspects of the global corporate security policy. Configuring these devices to work in unison is difficult, especially if they are made by different vendors. Even testing or reverse engineering an existing configuration (say when a new security administrator takes over) is hard. Firewall configuration files are written in low level formalisms, whose readability is comparable to assembly code, and the global policy is spread over all the firewalls that are involved. To alleviate some of these difficulties, we designed and implemented a novel firewall analysis tool. Our software allows the administrator to easily discover and test the global firewall policy (either a deployed policy or a planned one). Our tool uses a minimal description of the network topology and directly parses the various vendor-specific low level configuration files. It interacts with the user through a query-and-answer session, which is conducted at a much higher level of abstruction. A typical question our tool can answer is "from which machines can our DMZ be reached and with which services?" Thus, the tool complements existing vulnerability analysis tools, as it can be used before a policy is actually deployed it operates on a more understandable level of abstraction, and it deals with all the firewalls at once.