Supply Constraints as a Market Friction: Evidence from an Online Labor Market
Supply Constraints as a Market Friction: Evidence from an Online Labor Market
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供应限制作为市场摩擦：来自在线劳动力市场的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Horton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Horton
在一些服务市场，买家不一定知道他们喜欢的卖家是否有能力承担拟议的项目。卖家不太可能宣传他们的真实能力，因为买家的询价和报价对卖家来说很有价值，即使他们不被追求。关于卖方能力的信息不对称及其对匹配形成的影响是本文研究的重点。使用在线劳动力市场的数据，我发现，当卖家有更多的建议可供选择时，卖家更有可能“拒绝”感兴趣的买家，而且这种关系很可能是因果关系。这些卖方拒绝似乎是必然的：我发现，当买方追求的第一个卖方拒绝该买方时，买方最终(与其他卖方)匹配的可能性大大降低。我用工具变量分析表明，这种因拒绝而减少的比赛形成是有原因的。经验发现的关键含义是，即使在一个技术搜索成本较低的密集市场，有关卖方能力的信息不对称也是重要的。
In some markets for services, buyers do not necessarily know whether their preferred seller has the capacity to take on a proposed project. Sellers are unlikely to advertise their true capacity because buyer inquiries and offers are valuable to sellers, even if they are not pursued. This information asymmetry about seller capacity and the effect it has on the formation of matches is the focus of this paper. Using data from an online labor market, I show that sellers are more likely to “reject” interested buyers when those sellers have more proposals to choose from and that this relationship is likely to be causal. These seller rejections appear to be consequential: I find that when the first seller pursued by a buyer rejects that buyer, the probability the buyer ultimately forms a match (with some other seller) is substantially lowered. I show with an instrumental variables analysis that this reduction in match formation from rejection is causal. The key implication of the empirical findings is that even in a thick marketplace with low technical search costs, information asymmetries about seller capacity are important.