Proximate and developmental analysis

Proximate and developmental analysis
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近期和发展分析

DOI:
10.1017/s0140525x00024948
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发表时间:
1989
影响因子:
29.3
通讯作者:
D. Salter
D. Salter
中科院分区:
心理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
D. Salter

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原始文章摘要:自愿行为之前有电生理“准备就绪电位”(RPS)。在自发动作不涉及预先计划的情况下,主要的负反相移大约在-550ms开始。这样的RPS被用来指示完全内源性自愿行为之前的大脑活动的最短起效时间。有意识的行动意图的时间是通过受试者在最初意识到打算或想要移动时对旋转地点的空间时钟位置的回忆而获得的(W)。W出现在-200ms左右。在对照实验中,皮肤刺激被计时(S),这有助于评估每个受试者在报告时钟时间以意识到任何感知事件时的错误。对于自发的自愿行为,RP起始时间比未校正的Ws早约350ms,为S校正的Ws早约400ms。这种差异的方向在整个过程中是一致的和显著的,无论使用哪种RP起始或W的测量方法。结论是,自发自愿行为的大脑启动是无意识开始的。然而,研究发现,在特定意识意图出现后的150毫秒左右的时间里,最终的行动决定仍然可以被有意识地控制。事实上,受试者可以在100-200毫秒的时间内“否决”运动表现,而不是在预定的行动时间之前。意识意志的作用不是发起特定的自愿行为,而是选择和控制意志的结果。有人提出,有意识的意志可以以一种允许的方式发挥作用,以允许或阻止无意识产生的行动意图的运动实施。或者,可能需要有意识的激活或触发,如果没有它,最终的运动输出将不会遵循无意识的大脑启动和准备过程。自愿过程和准备就绪的潜力:提出正确的问题
of the original article: Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological "readiness potentials" (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about —550 ms. Such RPs were used to indicate the minimum onset times for the cerebral activity that precedes a fully endogenous voluntary act. The time of conscious intention to act was obtained from the subject's recall of the spatial clock position of a revolving spot at the time of his initial awareness of intending or wanting to move (W). W occurred at about -200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event. For spontaneous voluntary acts, RP onset preceded the uncorrected Ws by about 350 ms and the Ws corrected for S by about 400 ms. The direction of this difference was consistent and significant throughout, regardless of which of several measures of RP onset or W were used. It was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously. However, it was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears. Subjects can in fact "veto " motor performance during a 100-200-ms period before a prearranged time to act. The role of conscious will would be not to initiate a specific voluntary act but rather to select and control volitional outcome. It is proposed that conscious will can function in a permissive fashion, either to permit or to prevent the motor implementation of the intention to act that arises unconsciously. Alternatively, there may be the need for a conscious activation or triggering, without which the final motor output would not follow the unconscious cerebral initiating and preparatory processes. Voluntary process and the readiness potential: Asking the right questions