Security Analysis of an Efficient Null Space-Based Homomorphic MAC Scheme Against Tag Pollution Attacks in RLNC

Security Analysis of an Efficient Null Space-Based Homomorphic MAC Scheme Against Tag Pollution Attacks in RLNC
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RLNC中基于空空间的高效同态MAC方案抗标签污染攻击的安全分析

DOI:
10.1109/access.2019.2926401
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
影响因子:
3.9
通讯作者:
Xu Maozhi
Xu Maozhi
中科院分区:
计算机科学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Chang Jinyong;Shao Bilin;Zhang Anling;Bian Genqing;Ji Yanyan;Xu Maozhi

文献摘要

相似文献

最近,Esfahani、Mantas和Rodriguez提出了一种针对随机线性网络编码(RLNC)的抵抗标签污染攻击(TPA)的同态消息认证码(MAC)方案,并给出了安全性分析。如Esfahani等人。他们的方案基于Kehdi和Li的零空间性质,主要贡献在于在为数据包生成标签时增加了交换过程。然而,在本文中,我们首先指出,Esfahani等人的S交换技术对于TPA安全性并不是必不可少的,因为底层的非交换同态MAC方案对TPA是安全的,并且交换过程仅以不可忽略的因素改善了TPA安全性。更重要的是,我们发现Esfahani等人的安全证据。是不正确和被误导的。特别是,根据Esfahani等人的说法。建议,应该增加邻居节点的数量以降低TPA的概率。然而,本文在Esfahani等人的S工作中给出了相反的建议,给出了所提出的同态MAC方案的精确证明。
Recently, Esfahani, Mantas, and Rodriguez proposed a homomorphic message authentication code (MAC) scheme for the random linear network coding (RLNC) to resist tag pollution attacks (TPAs), and also presented the security analysis. As Esfahani et al. said, their scheme is based on the null space properties of Kehdi and Li, and the main contribution lies in adding the process of swapping when generating the tags for data packets. However, in this paper, we first point out that Esfahani et al.’s swapping technique is not essential for the TPA security, because the underlying non-swapping homomorphic MAC scheme has been secure against TPA and the process of swapping only improves the TPA security with a non-negligible factor. More importantly, we find that the security proof of Esfahani et al. is incorrect and misguided. In particular, according to Esfahani et al. suggestion, one should enlarge the number of neighbor nodes to reduce the probability of the TPA. However, this paper gives contrary suggestions in Esfahani et al.’s work by presenting the precise proof for the proposed homomorphic MAC scheme.