Security Analysis of an Efficient Null Space-Based Homomorphic MAC Scheme Against Tag Pollution Attacks in RLNC
Security Analysis of an Efficient Null Space-Based Homomorphic MAC Scheme Against Tag Pollution Attacks in RLNC
复制标题
RLNC中基于空空间的高效同态MAC方案抗标签污染攻击的安全分析
DOI:
10.1109/access.2019.2926401
复制
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
影响因子:
3.9
通讯作者:
Xu Maozhi
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Chang Jinyong;Shao Bilin;Zhang Anling;Bian Genqing;Ji Yanyan;Xu Maozhi
Recently, Esfahani, Mantas, and Rodriguez proposed a homomorphic message authentication code (MAC) scheme for the random linear network coding (RLNC) to resist tag pollution attacks (TPAs), and also presented the security analysis. As Esfahani et al. said, their scheme is based on the null space properties of Kehdi and Li, and the main contribution lies in adding the process of swapping when generating the tags for data packets. However, in this paper, we first point out that Esfahani et al.’s swapping technique is not essential for the TPA security, because the underlying non-swapping homomorphic MAC scheme has been secure against TPA and the process of swapping only improves the TPA security with a non-negligible factor. More importantly, we find that the security proof of Esfahani et al. is incorrect and misguided. In particular, according to Esfahani et al. suggestion, one should enlarge the number of neighbor nodes to reduce the probability of the TPA. However, this paper gives contrary suggestions in Esfahani et al.’s work by presenting the precise proof for the proposed homomorphic MAC scheme.