CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.354387
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发表时间：
2002-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ulrike Malmendier;Geoffrey Tate
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ulrike Malmendier;Geoffrey Tate
我们认为，管理过度自信可以解释企业投资扭曲。过于自信的经理人高估了他们投资项目的回报，并认为外部资金过于昂贵。因此，当它们拥有充足的内部资金时，它们会过度投资，但当它们需要外部融资时，它们会削减投资。本文利用福布斯500强CEO个人投资组合和公司投资决策的面板数据对过度自信假说进行了检验。如果首席执行官们一直未能减少他们个人对公司特定风险的暴露，我们就把他们归类为过度自信。我们发现，过度自信的CEO的投资是显着更响应现金流，特别是在股权依赖型公司。
We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company-specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity-dependent firms.