Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage
Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage
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声誉效应和在职（解除）优势
DOI：
10.1561/100.00016057
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Richard Van Weelden
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Navin Kartik;Richard Van Weelden
我们研究选举责任的动态模型。政客的政策偏好是他们的私人信息，所以官员们采取行动来影响选民™™S对欧元的信念，即建立欧元的声誉，并改善他们的连任前景。由此产生的行为可能是社会合意的(欧元œGood Reputation Effects)，也可能是不受欢迎的(œBad Reputation Effects)。在其他条件相同的情况下，当新当选的官员面临比现有官员更大的声誉压力时，良好的声誉效应会导致在任劣势，而不良的声誉效应会产生在任优势。我们将这些结果与民主国家在任效应的经验模式联系起来。
We study dynamic models of electoral accountability. Politicians’ policy preferences are their private information, so officeholders act to influence the electorate’s beliefs—i.e., to build reputation—and improve their re-election prospects. The resulting behavior may be socially desirable (“good reputation effects†) or undesirable (“bad reputation effects†). When newly-elected officeholders face stronger reputation pressures than their established counterparts, good reputation effects give rise to incumbency disadvantage while bad reputation effects induce incumbency advantage, all else equal. We relate these results to empirical patterns on incumbency effects across democracies.