Quantitative analysis of Control Flow Checking mechanisms for soft errors
Quantitative analysis of Control Flow Checking mechanisms for soft errors
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软错误控制流检查机制的定量分析
DOI:
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发表时间:
2014
期刊:
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通讯作者:
Carole
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Aviral Shrivastava;Abhishek Rhisheekesan;Reiley Jeyapaul;Carole
Control Flow Checking (CFC) based techniques have gained a reputation of providing effective, yet low-overhead protection from soft errors. The basic idea is that if the control flow - or the sequence of instructions that are executed - is correct, then most probably the execution of the program is correct. Although researchers claim the effectiveness of the proposed CFC techniques, we argue that their evaluation has been inadequate and can even be wrong! Recently, the metric of vulnerability has been proposed to quantify the susceptibility of computation to soft errors. Laced with this comprehensive metric, we quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of several existing CFC schemes, and obtain surprising results. Our results show that existing CFC techniques are not only ineffective in protecting computation from soft errors, but that they incur additional power and performance overheads. Software-only CFC protection schemes (CFCSS [14], CFCSS+NA [2], and CEDA [18]) increase system vulnerability by 18% to 21% with 17% to 38% performance overhead; Hybrid CFC protection technique, CFEDC [4] also increases the vulnerability by 5%; While the vulnerability remains almost the same for hardware only CFC protection technique, CFCET [15], they cause overheads of design cost, area, and power due to the hardware modifications required for their implementations.