Hardware Countermeasures against DPA ? A Statistical Analysis of Their Effectiveness
Hardware Countermeasures against DPA ? A Statistical Analysis of Their Effectiveness
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-540-24660-2_18
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发表时间：
2004-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Mangard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Mangard
在过去几年中，已经开发了许多针对差分功率分析 (DPA) 攻击的硬件对策。使用此类对策来保护其设备的密码设备设计者面临着选择和实施合适的对策组合的艰巨任务。每个设备都有不同的要求，因此没有通用的解决方案来保护设备免受 DPA 攻击。本文采用统计方法来确定硬件对策对 DPA 攻击所需样本数量的影响。这种方法产生了一种计算方法，使设计人员能够在整个设计过程中评估其设备对 DPA 攻击的抵抗力。这样，可以轻松比较不同的对策组合，并避免昂贵的设计迭代。
Many hardware countermeasures against differential power analysis (DPA) attacks have been developed during the last years. Designers of cryptographic devices using such countermeasures to protect their devices have the challenging task to select and implement a suitable combination of countermeasures. Every device has different requirements, and so there is no universal solution to protect devices against DPA attacks.In this article, a statistical approach is pursued to determine the effect of hardware countermeasures on the number of samples needed in DPA attacks. This approach results in a calculation method that enables designers to assess the resistance of their devices against DPA attacks throughout the design process. This way, different combinations of countermeasures can be easily compared and costly design iterations can be avoided.