Running out of steam? A political incentive perspective of FDI inflows in China
Running out of steam? A political incentive perspective of FDI inflows in China
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DOI：
10.1057/s41267-020-00366-2
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发表时间：
2020-09
影响因子：
11.6
通讯作者：
Danqing Wang;Zhitao Zhu;Shuo Chen;X. Luo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Danqing Wang;Zhitao Zhu;Shuo Chen;X. Luo
借鉴国家官僚主义的社会学文献，我们发展了FDI流入的政治激励视角。我们认为，作为国家官僚机构职业发展的核心特征，政治任期会影响新任命的政府官员的激励，进而影响他们为实现国家吸引外国直接投资的目标所做的努力。由于法定退休年龄限制了职业发展，在第一届任期内的官员认为他们有更好的晋升机会，因此比那些继续在现任职位上工作的官员有更强的晋升动机。我们采用差异中的差异设计，对2003年至2010年中国城市政府领导人及其城市的FDI流入量进行了研究，从而验证了这一论点。结果表明，在政治更替后新任命的第一任领导人比连任领导人吸引更多的FDI流入。当新领导人即将退休时，这种差异较小，但如果他们被任命到GDP表现较低的城市，这种差异就会更大。本研究提供了国内FDI变化的新视角，并通过调查政府官员的政治激励，扩展了关于政治制度作用的文献。
Drawing on the sociological literature of state bureaucracy, we develop a political incentive perspective on FDI inflows. We argue that political term, as a core feature of career advancement in state bureaucracy, influences the incentives of newly appointed government officials and in turn their efforts toward achieving the state’s goal of attracting FDI. Due to the mandatory retirement age which limits the career advancement, officials in their first terms perceive that they have better chances of promotion and hence have stronger incentives to work toward advancement than those continuing to serve in the current position for the following term. We test this argument by examining Chinese city government leaders and FDI inflows in their cities from 2003 to 2010, using a difference-in-differences design. The results show that first-term leaders, who are newly appointed after political turnover, attract more FDI inflows than continuing leaders. The difference is smaller when the new leaders are close to retirement, but greater if they are appointed to cities with low prior GDP performance. This study offers a new perspective on intra-country FDI variations, and extends the literature on the role of political institutions by investigating the political incentives of government officials.