The Political Economy of International Debt

缺乏超国家的法律权威对世界资本市场的一体化造成了重大限制。拉丁美洲主要债务国与其西方银行债权人之间正在进行的债务重新安排谈判说明了可能出现的那种问题。最近，在理解债务重组谈判的经济学方面取得了相当大的进展，本项目的第一部分建立在这一研究的基础上。这项工作将涉及分析隐性主权债务合同的讨价还价理论方法。还将有工作试图比较对一个国家拒绝偿还债务的可能成本的不同评估。该项目的另一部分涉及开发一个两国的一般均衡模型，以讨价还价从商品和金融资产中获得的收益。这一分析代表了一种尝试，即提供一个完全明确的国家风险模型。本项目的最后一部分涉及探讨债务国内部的选举压力如何导致实际汇率的高估和外债的过度积累。起点将是最近开发的分析政治预算周期的框架。这项研究很重要，因为它将更好地了解债务人和债权人贸易伙伴之间的经济关系。

The lack of a supranational legal authority places important limitations on the integration of world capital markets. The ongoing negotiations over debt rescheduling between major Latin American debtors and their Western bank creditors illustrate the kind of problems which can arise. Recently, there has been considerable progress in understanding the economics of debt-restructuring negotiations, and the first part of this project builds on that research. The work will involve bargaining-theoretic approaches to analyzing implicit sovereign debt-contracts. There will also be work attempting to compare different assessments of the possible costs to a country of repudiating its debt. Another part of the project involves developing a two-country, general-equilibrium model of the bargaining over gains from trade in both goods and financial assets. The analysis represents an attempt to provide a fully specified model of country risk. The last part of this project deals with exploring how electoral pressures within debtor countries can cause a cyclical, over valuation of the real exchange rate, and over accumulation of foreign debt. The starting point will be a recently developed framework for analyzing political budget cycles. This research is important because it will provide a better understanding of the economic relations between debtor and creditor trading partners.