Multiagent Incentives, the Limits of Coordination, and Efficiency

现在人们很清楚，在信息不对称的经济体中，委托人和代理人之间的契约通常会产生信息外部性。本研究的目的是了解经济主体达到有效结果的能力的两个重要限制因素之间的相互作用：不完全信息导致的激励问题和协调个人群体行动的困难。这种环境的一个例子是，在这种环境中，代理人面临道德风险，交易无法公开监控。将制定标准来描述这种环境中的受限效率，并用于分析受这种限制组合约束的代理人所进行的市场博弈模型。合作和非合作解决方案的概念将被开发，以调查这种博弈的结果是否有效。还将研究这种经济的结果在多大程度上可以用适当扩大商品空间的阿罗-德布鲁经济的竞争平衡或林达尔平衡来表征。研究结果将用于重新解释政府在改善受这些限制的经济体的分配方面所发挥的作用，以及政府的作用如何根据其监督权力而变化。本研究解决的信息不对称问题是基本的，但也可能具有重要的实际意义。政府在监控方面相对于私人代理人的优势的拟议模型可以重塑决策者在存在信息不对称的情况下有关适当政府干预的建议。

It is now well understood that in economies with asymmetric information, a contract between a principal and an agent typically generates informational externalities. The goal of this research is to understand the interaction between two important restrictions on economic agents' abilities to reach efficient outcomes: incentive problems resulting from imperfect information and the difficulties of coordinating the actions of groups of individuals. An example of such an environment is one in which agents are subject to moral hazard and trades cannot be publically monitored. Criteria will be developed for describing constrained efficiency in such environments and for use in analyzing models of market games played by agents subject to this combination of restrictions. Cooperative and non-cooperative solution concepts will be developed to investigate the sense in which the outcomes of such games are or are not constrained efficient. The extent to which the outcomes in such economies can be characterized in terms of competitive equilibria or Lindahl equilibria of Arrow-Debreu economies for a suitably augmented commodity space also will be studied. The results will be used to reinterpret the role played by government in improving the allocations in economies subject to these restrictions and how the government's role varies, depending upon its monitoring powers. The issues of asymmetric information addressed in this research are fundamental but potentially also they have great practical importance. The proposed modelling of the advantages the government has in monitoring vis-a-vis private agents can reshape the advice given to policy makers concerning appropriate government intervention in the presence of informational asymmetries.