Coordination Issues in Industrial Organization

协调问题对消费者和公司都很重要。消费者可能希望协调他们对光顾哪家公司的选择，特别是如果生产技术具有规模经济的特征。现有公司可能会认识到在阻止进入方面的协调所带来的好处。特别是，如果现有公司拥有关于进入市场的盈利能力的更好信息(与潜在进入者相比)，那么它们协调信号(例如价格)选择的能力就变得非常重要。大多数以前的研究忽略了协调的问题，假设消费者以简单的方式行事，而单一的在任公司试图阻止进入。首先，该项目发展和扩展了一种新的非信息性广告理论，在该理论中，当存在规模经济且价格信息难以沟通时，显然是浪费的广告被用来协调消费者的购买。该分析提供了对观察到的零售广告的洞察，存在的经验谜题，以及一种新的博弈理论方法论。该项目还对非价格广告降低价格的程度进行了实证研究。其次，缺乏准确价格信息的消费者可能会通过抵制之前行使垄断权的公司来限制垄断定价。消费者协调抵制的可信度能力将被证明取决于规模经济的方向。这项工作在规模经济和垄断力量之间找到了一种迄今未曾探索过的联系。最后，该项目检查了公司之间的协调。当进入者使用公司价格作为进入盈利能力的信号时，现有公司将希望协调信号的选择。无法协调将导致不涉及价格扭曲的信号均衡。这一分析颠覆了先前单一现任者的预测，并构成了向多信号发送者模型的方法论进步。这是一个令人兴奋的项目，它为产业组织中的一系列实质性问题提供了新的见解，并提高了我们对企业和消费者在市场上协调行动方式的理解。该项目在实质上和方法上有助于我们理解零售广告、消费者抵制作为一种限制垄断权力的手段和特定行业中多家公司的进入威慑。

Issues of coordination are important to consumers and firms. Consumers may wish to coordinate on their selection of which firm to patronize, especially if economies of scale characterize the production technology. Incumbent firms may recognize gains from coordination in the deterrence of entry. In particular if incumbent firms have superior information (as compared to a potential entrant) about the profitability of entry, then their ability to coordinate the selection of signals (prices, for example) become quite important. Most previous work has ignored the issue of coordination, by assuming that consumers act in a simple fashion and that a single incumbent firm attempts to deter entry. First, this project develops and extends a new theory of non.informative advertising, in which apparently wasteful advertisements are used to coordinate consumer purchases when economies of scale exist and price information is difficult to communicate. The analysis provides insight into observed retail advertisements, existing empirical puzzles, and a new game.theoretic methodology. The project also explores empirically the extent to which non.price advertising lowers prices. Second, consumers lacking precise price information may nevertheless restrain monopoly pricing by boycotting firms that have previously exercised monopoly power. The ability of consumers to credibility coordinate a boycott will be shown to depend on the direction of scale economies. This work draws a heretofore unexplored connection between scale economies and monopoly power. Finally, the project examines coordination among firms. When an entrant uses firms' prices as signals of the profitability of entry, incumbent firms will wish to coordinate the selection of signals. The inability to coordinate will result in signaling equilibria that involve no distortion in price. This analysis reverses previous single incumbent predictions and constitutes a methodological advance into multiple.signal.sender models. This is an exciting project that provides new insights into a wide range of substantive issues in industrial organization as well as improving our understanding of the way firms and consumers coordinate their actions in markets. The project contributes substantively and methodological to our understanding of retail advertising, consumer boycotts as a means of restraining monopoly power and entry deterrence by multiple firms in a given industry.