Sequential Models of Regulation with Limited Commitment

本研究项目对我们理解商业监管做出了重要的方法论和实质性贡献。在方法上，大多数关于监管行为的大量文献都假设监管机构是监管环境中的“先发者”，并且能够致力于激励机制，诱导被监管公司如实披露其私人信息或采取代价高昂的隐藏行动。本项目考察监管价格和标准制定，因为监管机构往往不愿或无法对具体的监管行动或政策做出可信的承诺。从本质上讲，这项研究为技术强制标准提供了新的见解。技术强制法规是指相关机构制定的标准成本高昂，甚至使用现有技术无法达到的标准。这是一类重要而有趣的问题，因为技术强制标准的制定被用于环境法规，产品和职业安全法规，以及产品功效和耐用性法规。该项目侧重于有限监管承诺对受监管公司的顺序均衡定价和投资策略的影响。首先，在标准制定的背景下研究技术强制监管。强调了企业投资新的合规技术和标准跨期演进的动机。其次，该项目考虑了一个价格监管模型，在该模型中，监管者在企业进行资本投资后决定其费率结构。第三，研究了监管承诺对服务质量的影响。

This research project makes important methodological and substantive contributions to our understanding of business regulation. Methodologically, most of the sizable literature on regulatory behavior assumes that the regulator is a "first-mover" in the regulatory setting and is able to commit to incentive mechanisms which induce the regulated firm to truthfully reveal its private information or undertake costly hidden actions. This project examines regulatory price and standard setting where regulators are often unwilling or unable to make credible commitments to specific regulatory actions or policies. Substantively, the research provides new insights into technology-forcing standards. Technology-forcing regulations are those in which the agency writes a standard that is costly, or even impossible to meet using current technology. This is an important and interesting class of problems because technology- forcing standard setting is used in environmental regulation, regulation of product and occupational safety, and regulation of product efficacy and durability. The project focuses on the effects of limited regulatory commitment on sequential equilibrium pricing and investment strategies by regulated firms. First technology-forcing regulation is studied in a standard setting context. The incentives for the firm to invest in new compliance technologies and the intertemporal evolution of standards are emphasized. Second, the project considers a model of price regulation in which the regulator determines the firm's rate structure after it has made its investment in capital. Third, the effects of regulatory commitment on the quality of service are studied.