Social Organization and Social Evolution

9310276 Blume传统的战略互动模型假设一群高度理性的参与者以非合作的方式相互互动，以确定集体的结果。虽然这些模型提高了我们对集中社会化互动的理解，比如在组织良好的金融资产市场中看到的互动，但它们并没有解决劳动力市场、零售服务市场和许多非市场社会环境中出现的那种分散的非合作竞争。这种现象最好以具有空间结构的游戏为模型。玩家生活在特定的地点。每个玩家只与他的邻居竞争（或者更普遍地说，互动）。尽管如此，远距离玩家的选择也会产生间接影响，因为玩家之间会共享邻居，等等。通过这种分散的空间或地理结构进行的社会互动与集中的社会互动形成鲜明对比，在集中的社会互动中，每个人都直接与他人互动。本研究将探讨当互动分散时，战略选择如何随着时间的推移而演变。初步研究表明，传统博弈论的尖锐理性假设对于理解竞争如何演变以及最终实现的结果是不必要的。因此，本研究将研究放弃传统的超理性模型而倾向于对个体行为进行更宽松的限制的后果，并研究玩家群体的空间结构如何增强或抑制游戏组织（例如，所谓的“协调游戏”中的合作进化）。该项目的另一个主题是通过集中的社会互动和分散的互动所达到的社会结果之间的对比。最后，该项目将研究不同“交互技术”的分支，如随机匹配和固定伙伴，以促进集体选择的进化。＊＊＊

9310276 Blume Traditional models of strategic interaction assume that a population of highly rational players interacts with one another in a non-cooperative fashion to determine a collective outcome. While these models improve our understanding of centralized socialized interaction such as that seen in well-organized financial asset markets, they do not address the kind of decentralized non- cooperative competition that arises in labor markets, markets for retail services, and many non-market social settings. Such phenomena are best modeled as games with a spatial structure. Players live at given locations. Each player competes (or, more generally, interacts) only with his near neighbors. Nonetheless the choice of distant players has an indirect effect through a string of players who share neighbors who share neighbors, etc. Social interaction through this decentralized spatial or geographic structure stands in contrast to centralized social interaction wherein everyone interacts directly with everyone else. This research will investigate how strategic choice evolves over time when interaction is decentralized. Preliminary research has shown that the sharp rationality hypotheses of traditional game theory are not necessary to understand how competition evolves and what outcomes are ultimately achieved. Consequently the investigation will study the consequences of abandoning the traditional models of hyper-rationality in favor of looser strictures on individual behavior, and study how the spatial structure of the player population enhances or inhibits the organization of play (e.g., the evolution of cooperation in so- called "coordination games"). Another theme of the project is the contrast between social outcomes that can be reached through centralized social interaction and those that are achieved with decentralized interaction. Finally, the project will study the ramifications of different "interaction technologies," such as random matching and fixed partners, for the evolution of collective choice. ***