Organizational Processes with Incomplete Contracts

9320856 Rotemberg本研究探讨两个相关的组织结构问题。第一个问题是为什么会出现冲突，以及为什么冲突会以可预测的形式出现。第二个目标是了解分配正式权力的过程。在这项研究中，被问到的基本问题是，哪些群体和个人倾向于负责各种决策？为了理解这一过程，本研究将重点放在营销部门和生产部门之间的规范冲突上。通常，制造部门希望大规模生产相对较少的产品，而营销部门则希望拥有“完整的产品线”。对此的一种解释是，过去公司内部的活动让不同领域的员工学到了不同的东西。关于正式权威的第二个问题，该研究试图建立一个模型，其中信息流的成本导致公司将某些个人置于权威中，但权威和权力并不总是驻留在同一个人身上。这项研究的结果将为理解公司从将有价值的员工置于权威地位中受益的情况和那些他们没有受益的情况提供基础。＊＊＊

9320856 Rotemberg This research explores two related issues of organization structure. The first issue is why conflicts arise and why the conflicts take on predictable forms. The second aim is to understand the process for allocating formal authority. In the study the basic question that is asked is which groups and individuals tend to be put in charge of various decisions? In order to understand the process, the study concentrates on the canonical conflict between marketing and production departments. Usually, the manufacturing section wants to produce relatively few products on a large scale while the marketing section would prefer to have a "complete product line". One explanation for this is that past activity within the firm has led employees in different areas to learn different things. On the second issue of formal authority, the study seeks to develop a model where costs to information flow lead firms to put certain individuals in authority but the authority and power do not always reside in the same person. The results from this study would provide a basis for understanding the cases where firms benefit from putting valuable employees in authority and those where they do not. ***