Collaborative Research on Binding Agreements

9414114雷这个项目研究在战略情况下具有约束力的协议的性质。考虑了一个模型，在该模型中，原则上可以在任何一组代理人之间撰写具有约束力的协议。该项目严格分析了在自由和不受限制的谈判的平衡中达成的协议。在最基本的层面上，调查员处理的问题是如何对最终导致签署协议的一系列谈判进行概念化。这将对讨价还价理论做出重要贡献，因为关于博弈行为讨价还价的文献还不存在。研究的主要焦点是具有约束力的协议的效率问题。这个项目挑战了经济学家们的共识，即如果能够在没有信息不对称的情况下制定具有约束力的协议，那么合作的好处将得到充分利用。调查员将概括他们以前在存在与有效或合作的结果不相对应的外部影响的情况下达成具有约束力的协定的例子。只有当有三个或更多代理时，才会出现这些结果。低效率现象的出现与产权的分配密切相关。这一系列基础研究与全球变化的人的层面有关，因为它将为分析达成具有约束力的环境协议所需的谈判提供新的见解和更好的工具。例如，著名的科斯定理被用来证明，在存在污染的情况下，竞争市场将产生有效的协议。调查人员的研究表明，当排污权被分配给现状时，效率就会崩溃。

9414114 Ray This project studies the nature of binding agreements in strategic situations. A model is considered in which binding agreements can, in principle, be written among any group of agents. The project rigorously analyzes the agreements that occur in an equilibrium of free and unrestricted negotiation. At the most fundamental level, the investigators address the issue of how to conceptualize the series of negotiations that ultimately lead to the signing of an agreement. This will make an important contribution to bargaining theory because the literature on bargaining over actions of games is nonexistent. The principal focus of the research is on the question of efficiency in binding agreements. This project challenges the consensus among economists that if binding agreements can be written in the absence of informational asymmetries, then the gains from cooperation will be fully exploited. The investigators will generalize examples from their previous work of binding agreements in the presence of external effects that do not correspond to an efficient or cooperative outcome. These results arise only when there are three or more agents. The emergence of inefficiency is closely related to the assignment of property rights. This line of basic research is relevant to the Human Dimensions of Global Change because it will provide new insights and better tools for analyzing negotiations needed to reach binding environmental agreements. For example, the famous Coase Theorem was used to show that competitive markets will produce efficient agreements in the presence of pollution. The investigators' research shows that there is a breakdown of efficiency when the right to pollute is the assigned status quo.