Collaborative Research on Experimental Studies of Iterated Rationality in Noncooperative Games

这是与Camerer博士（SBR-9511001）的合作提案。pi提出在经济博弈论的背景下研究迭代理性。迭代理性指的是相信别人是理性的，别人相信你是理性的，你相信别人相信你是理性的，等等。迭代理性是博弈论分析的中心假设，已被应用于经济学、心理学和其他社会科学的大量现象。由于这一假设的经验基础薄弱，pi计划从几个方面对其进行检验。首先，他们将使用一个数字游戏，在这个游戏中，参赛者对中奖数字的估计揭示了参赛者相信迭代理性的程度。其次，他们将使用各种数字游戏来确定程序中的哪些变化会促进更理性的选择。这种程序上的变化将提供线索，让人们了解受试者对对手的理性的假设。第三，pi将检查具有各种特征的参与者，例如群体同质性或数字游戏经验，以确定影响参与者理性的因素。最后，pi将检查参与者在一个游戏中了解到的合理性是否会转移到另一个游戏中。

This is a collaborative proposal with Dr. Camerer (SBR-9511001). The PIs propose to study iterated rationality in the context of economic game theory. Iterated rationality refers to the belief that others are rational, that others believe that you are rational, that you believe that others believe that you are rational, etc. Iterated rationality is a central assumption of game-theoretic analyses that have been applied to a large number of phenomena in economics, psychology, and other social sciences. Since the empirical basis for this assumption is weak, the PIs plan to examine it in several ways. First, they will use a numbers game in which the estimate of a winning number by a contestant reveals to what extent that contestant believes in iterated rationality. Second, they will use variations of the numbers game in order to determine which changes in the procedure foster more rational choices. Such procedural changes will provide clues as to subjects assumptions about the rationality of their opponents. Third, the PIs will examine participants with various characteristics, such as group homogeneity or experience with the numbers game, in order to determine what factors influence participants rationality. Finally the PIs will examine whether what a participant learns about rationality in one game transfers to a different game.