Collaborative Research: Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Observation of others versus Cheap Talk as Coordination Devices

在简单的一次性战略情况下，个体如何在“好结果”上实现协调？一种被广泛探索的可能性是，他们参与了某种预演交流--低俗的谈话--在这种交流中，他们努力让对方相信他们打算玩的动作。另一种较少被探索的可能性是，个体在决定玩哪种动作时会考虑他们伴侣过去的行为。虽然这两种可能性已经被分开考虑，但还没有研究比较这两种设备在解决协调问题方面的相对重要性。该项目涉及一项人类受试者的实验，该实验将允许比较闲谈和观察过去的行动所起的作用，作为实现良好结果的协调的手段。对过去行为的低调谈论或观察的效果也将与标准(控制)情况进行比较，后者不允许对过去的行为进行低调交谈或观察。在所有情况下，受试者都将玩简单的双人游戏，并将根据他们在每一场游戏中的表现获得报酬。这项实验的结果将被用来扩展博弈论模型，即个体如何将公平的概念纳入他们的决策，以及他们如何利用战略环境中可用的不同类型的信息。在更总体的层面上，实验结果将提供更好的理解，让人们更好地理解在简单的一次战略竞赛中，低调交谈和观察过去的行动作为确保“好结果”的手段的相对优点。这些信息不仅对经济学家有用，而且对更广泛的受众有用，包括政策制定者和其他能够影响公众行动或预期的人。

How do individuals achieve coordination on `good outcomes` in simple one shot strategic situations? One much explored possibility is that they engage in some kind of preplay communication- cheap talk-in which they endeavor to convince one another of the actions they intend to play. Another, less explored, possibility is that individuals take account of the past actions of their partners when deciding which actions to play. While these two possibilities have been considered separately, there has been no research that compares the relative importance of these two devices as aids in solving coordination problems. This project involves an experiment with human subjects that will allow for a comparison of the roles played by cheap talk and observation of past actions as devices for achieving coordination on good outcomes. The effect of cheap talk or observation of past actions will also be compared with the standard (control) case where cheap talk or observation of past actions is not allowed. In all cases, subjects will play simple two player games and will be paid according to their performance in each game. The results of this experiment will be used to extend game theoretic models of how individuals incorporate notions of fairness into their decisions and how they make use of the different types of information available in strategic environments. At a more aggregate level, the experimental results will provide a better understanding of the relative merits of cheap talk and observation of past actions as devices for ensuring `good outcomes` in simple one shot strategic contests. Such information will be useful not only to economists but to a much wider audience, including policymakers and others who are in a position to influence the actions or expectations of the public.