Underdetermination, Real Antirealism and a New Induction on the History of Science

项目摘要：00- 94001普雷斯顿·斯坦福决心不足，真实的反现实主义，科学实在论的现有挑战[我们的科学理论应该被理解为（至少是近似地）真实地描述了不可接近的自然领域]，这一点既广泛地使用了“证据对理论的不充分决定”的主张，（即我们的证据总是不足以支持现有的理论，而不是同样被证据所证实的其他可能性），或者是“悲观归纳法”，而不是过去的许多科学理论，尽管这些理论表现出了我们可能用来证实现有理论的同样的证据和实践优点，但后来被证明是错误的。斯坦福大学博士建议在一系列相关的论文中提出以下论点，以此挑战现有辩论的框架，并为反实在论进行新的辩护，这些论文将构成未来一本书的核心。首先，斯坦福大学博士认为，现有的关于不充分决定的讨论几乎完全集中在现有理论的假定“经验等价物”的存在和地位上是错误的：生成此类等价物的流行算法只是将不充分决定问题换成熟悉的哲学栗子（特别是笛卡尔怀疑论或虚假证实问题），而经验等价物的少数令人信服的例子根本不会支持不充分决定的拥护者希望得出的令人陶醉的道德。 然而，斯坦福大学认为，实在论同样受到经验上不等价的假设的前景的威胁，这些假设和现有的理论一样，都得到了我们手头所有实际证据的充分证实，只要我们考虑的每一个理论和证据都出现这种短暂的不充分决定的困境。此外，他呼吁对科学史的新归纳，认为这种反复出现的，短暂的不充分决定的困境是我们自己的。《新归纳法》不是简单地指出过去成功理论的错误，而是指出，在整个科学研究的历史中，在几乎每一个科学领域，我们都一再占据着一种认识论的立场，在这种立场上，我们只能设想一个或几个被现有证据充分证实的理论，虽然随后的调查经常显示存在进一步的理论，正如我们根据这些证据所接受的理论一样，这些理论也得到了当时所有证据的证实。他为这种新归纳法辩护，反对潜在的反对意见，并认为在科学研究文献中有影响力的独特的整体论主张最好被视为支持这种新归纳法的一个版本。最后，斯坦福大学博士为新归纳法和最初的悲观归纳法辩护，反对最近有影响力的现实主义者对科学史的阅读，这种阅读发现过去理论的真正特征或方面是那些对它们的成功负责的人，他反驳说，现实主义者诉诸于一个共同的参照点，这一事实实际上保证了这种匹配（我们目前的理论信念）在判断过去成功的理论正确的地方和什么特征是其成功的原因时。

Project Abstract: 00-94001Preston StanfordUnderdetermination, Real Antirealism, and a New Induction on the History of ScienceExisting challenges to Scientific Realism [the position that our scientific theories should be understood as (at least approximately) true descriptions of the inaccessible domains of nature] have made extensive use of either the claim of the "Underdetermination of Theories by Evidence" (i.e. that our evidence is invariably insufficient to favor existing theories over alternative possibilities equally well confirmed by that very evidence) or of the "Pessimistic Induction" over the many past scientific theories that have turned out to be false despite exhibiting the same evidential and practical virtues that we might take to confirm present theories. Dr. Stanford proposes to challenge the framework of the existing debate and to pursue a new defense of Antirealism by developing the following line of argument in a series of connected papers forming the core of a future book.First, Dr. Stanford argues that it is a mistake for existing discussions of underdetermination to focus almost exclusively on the existence and status of putative "empirical equivalents" to existing theories: popular algorithms for generating such equivalents simply trade in the problem of underdetermination for familiar philosophical chestnuts (in particular, Cartesian skepticism or the problem of spurious confirmation), while the few convincing examples of empirical equivalents simply will not support the intoxicating morals that champions of underdetermination have hoped to draw. Stanford argues, however, that Realism is no less threatened by the prospect of empirically inequivalent hypotheses that are nonetheless equally well-confirmed by all the actual evidence we have in hand as are existing theories, so long as such a transient underdetermination predicament recurs for each theory and body of evidence we consider. Furthermore, he appeals to a New Induction on the History of Science to argue that this predicament of recurrent, transient underdetermination is our own. Rather than simply pointing to the falsity of past successful theories, the New Induction points out that we have, throughout the history of scientific inquiry and in virtually every scientific field, repeatedly occupied an epistemic position in which we could conceive of only one or a few theories that were well-confirmed by the available evidence, while subsequent inquiry has routinely revealed the existence of further theories just as well confirmed by the totality of evidence then available as were those we accepted on the strength of that very evidence. He defends this New Induction against potential objections and argue that the distinctively holist claim of underdetermination influential in the science studies literature is best seen as supporting a version of this same New Induction. Finally, Dr. Stanford defends both the New Induction and the original Pessimistic Induction against the recently influential Realist reading of the history of science which finds the true features or aspects of past theories to be those responsible for their success, arguing in reply that this match is virtually guaranteed by the fact that the Realist appeals to a common point of reference (our current theoretical beliefs) in judging both what a past successful theory got right and what features were responsible for its success.