Bank Relationships and the Misallocation of Credit

日本严重的经济危机与日本股票和房地产市场的崩溃以及日本银行业健康状况的急剧恶化有关，这是二十世纪后期的重大经济事件之一。更令人吃惊的是，这个世界第二大经济体在十多年的时间里一直停滞不前，即使在今天，也没有迹象表明它恢复了战后大部分时间的强劲健康。为什么这种经济疲软持续了这么长时间，这是一个重要的公共政策问题，也是大量猜测和辩论的来源，而金融业的问题可能是一个关键因素。特别是，陷入困境的日本银行的信贷分配不当，以及它们与陷入困境的公司的历史联系所产生的压力，可能是日本经济持续停滞的一个关键因素。本研究的重点是两种形式的公司从属关系：以银行为中心的金融（横向）keiretsus和主银行系统。一个令人担忧的问题是，这些公司关系颠覆了公司治理，使公司免受外部董事、股东和债权人的约束，从而导致不理想的商业和财务决策。虽然以前的研究已经研究了这些公司关系如何影响投资决策、股票回报和公司治理决策，但他们并没有直接研究这些关系如何影响信贷的可用性。这项研究将利用一个独特的公司一级数据库，审查向公司提供的贷款，以确定这种融资受公司关系影响的程度，以及任何这种信贷分配不当对宏观经济活动和货币政策有效性的影响。这项研究有三个主要目标。第一个也是主要的目标是调查在公司和/或银行陷入困境期间，主要银行和经连联会对信贷分配的影响。初步证据显示，由于来自经连联合会和主要银行的压力，信贷被错配，而这种错配是政府政策允许的，甚至是鼓励的。第二个目标是调查这种信贷错配对宏观经济的影响，特别关注其对日本经济活动持续停滞的影响。第三个目标是调查陷入困境的银行部门对货币政策传导机制崩溃的贡献，从而导致货币政策无法重启日本经济。这项研究对应对银行危机的适当政策以及不适当政策的成本具有重要意义。如果稀缺的信贷分配给缺乏竞争力和陷入困境的公司，日本将不会经历经济衰退期间通常发生的重大重组所带来的自然净化，其后果是长期经济增长可能会减少。在这种情况下，经济增长可能不是因为总体信贷太少而受到抑制，而是因为稀缺的信贷被分配给了投资机会最少的公司。当这种信贷错配与国内银行贷款总额下降（由于银行面临难以达到资本要求的压力）相结合时，货币政策的传导可能会出现短路。此外，鉴于日本仍然是世界第二大经济体，解决这场危机对其他国家，特别是东亚国家的经济前景至关重要。

The severe economic crisis in Japan, associated with the collapse of the Japanese stock and real estate markets and the dramatic deterioration in the health of the Japanese banking sector, represents one of the major economic events of the late twentieth century. It is even more striking because the second largest economy in the world remained stagnant for more than a decade, and even today shows no evidence of returning to the robust health that characterized most of its postwar history. Why this economic weakness has persisted for so long is an important public policy issue and has been the source of substantial speculation and debate, with problems in the financial sector likely being a key contributor. In particular, the misallocation of credit by troubled Japanese banks associated with pressures emanating from their historical ties to troubled firms may be a key contributor to the continuing stagnation of the Japanese economy. Two forms of corporate affiliations are the focus of this study: bank-centered financial (horizontal) keiretsus and the main bank system. A concern is that these corporate affiliations have subverted corporate governance, insulating firms from the discipline that otherwise would come from outside directors, shareholders, and creditors, resulting in suboptimal business and financial decisions. While previous studies have examined how these corporate affiliations affect investment decisions, stock returns, and corporate governance decisions, they have not directly examined how such affiliations impact the availability of credit. This study will utilize a unique firm-level database that enables an examination of loans to firms to determine the extent to which such finance is affected by corporate affiliations, as well as the implications for macroeconomic activity and the effectiveness of monetary policy of any such misallocation of credit. The study has three main objectives. The first, and primary, objective is to investigate the impact of main bank and keiretsu affiliations on credit allocation during periods of firm and/or bank distress. Preliminary evidence suggests that credit has been misallocated due to pressures from keiretsu and main bank ties, and that this misallocation has been allowed, and even encouraged, by government policies. The second objective is to investigate the macroeconomic implications of this credit misallocation, in particular focusing on its contribution to the continuing stagnation of economic activity in Japan. The third objective is to investigate the contribution of the troubled banking sector to the breakdown of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and thus to the inability of monetary policy to restart the Japanese economy. This study has important implications for appropriate policies to deal with banking crises, as well as the costs of inappropriate policies. If scarce credit is allocated to uncompetitive and troubled firms, Japan will not experience the natural cleansing which results from the major restructuring that typically occurs in an economic downturn, with the consequence that longer-run economic growth may be reduced. In that instance, it may not be that economic growth is stifled from too little overall credit, but rather from scarce credit being allocated to firms with the least productive investment opportunities. When this misallocation of credit is combined with declining total domestic bank loans due to pressures on banks having difficulties achieving their capital requirements, the transmission of monetary policy can be short-circuited. Furthermore, given that the Japanese economy remains the second largest in the world, resolving the crisis is important for the economic prospects for other countries, especially those in East Asia.