Collaborative Research: Predictability and the Rule of Law: Overruling Precedent in State Supreme Courts

法治的理想取决于规则的制定和应用，这些规则是普遍的，中立的，确定的，明确的（Tamanaha 2004，97）。 如果法律的规则及其适用不符合这些标准，或者如果官方过度的酌处权削弱了法律的普遍性、确定性或明确性，就会损害公民对他们受法治而不是人治管辖的看法。社会和具体机构中的非正式规范可能会影响公民和官员理解和遵守特定正式规则的程度。 出于这个原因，它是至关重要的，以评估的方式，法律是调解和塑造的个人行为规范在特定的制度设置。在司法方面，遵循先例这一非正式规范的作用是加强法治，确保法官对同类案件一视同仁，为司法裁决提供可预测性和稳定性，并限制司法酌处权。 虽然遵循先例一直是丰富的描述性和规范性学术研究的主题，我们知道遵循先例的规范如何以及为什么在法院发展，什么因素维持或减少规范，以及规范如何影响司法机构的性质和生产力。 州最高法院为研究遵循先例提供了一个完美的实验室，因为州法院的制度特征之间存在着很大的差异。 本研究探讨遵守遵循先例，审查司法裁决推翻先例，在50个州的最高法院。 否决决定构成了对遵循先例规范的最极端的偏离。因此，发展系统的信息推翻行为将大大提高我们的理解法官愿意坚持规范。 我们将发展和测试假设的发展遵循先例的规范的基础上一个简单的司法行为模型从囚徒困境的游戏。 这一模式侧重于法官必须在法律中体现自己的政策偏好和遵循其前任的决定之间做出权衡。 从这个理论基础上，我们将推导出关于否决行为和一系列制度变量之间关系的假设，如法院规模，案件量，备审控制，任期长度，选择方法和成员的变化。 为了评估这些假设，我们建议收集数据，在50个州的最高法院在其历史时期的推翻决定。 这将产生一个由各州最高法院裁定的所有被驳回和驳回案件的综合数据库。使用这些数据，并采用各种统计方法，包括事件计数建模，我们将评估这些州最高法院的制度特征和他们推翻自己的先例（从而破坏法治）的倾向之间的联系。 我们希望确定，州最高法院法官更倾向于推翻他们的brethren（或前brethren）意见（1）系统中，法官选举和（2）系统与较短的任期长度。如果我们成功的话，结果将与我们的建议中提出的博弈论模型相一致，该模型基于这样一个概念，即法官是理性的行为者，他们将追求自己的政策目标，除非他们受到制度环境的限制。 如果法官的工作环境能促进法官之间的合作，并在法官犯错时有机会得到惩罚，那么就能促进先例的稳定，从而促进法治。

The ideal of the Rule of Law depends upon the formulation and application of rules that are general, neutral, certain, and clear (Tamanaha 2004, 97). Where the legal rules and their application fail to meet these standards, or where excessive official discretion weakens the generality, certainty or clarity of the law, it undermines citizens perception that they are governed by the rule of law rather than the rule of man. Although the rule of law typically refers to a system of formal norms, informal norms within society and specific institutions may affect the extent to which citizens and officials perceive and comply with particular formal rules. For this reason, it is critical to evaluate the manner in which law is mediated and shaped by individual behavioral norms within specific institutional settings. In the context of the judiciary, the informal norm of stare decisis operates to strengthen the rule of law by ensuring that judges treat like cases alike, by providing for predictability and stability in judicial decision making, and by constraining judicial discretion. Although stare decisis has been the subject of abundant descriptive and normative scholarship, we know every little about how and why the norm of stare decisis develops in courts, what factors perpetuate or diminish the norm, and how the norm influences the character and productivity of judicial institutions. The state supreme courts offer a perfect laboratory to study stare decisis, since substantial variation exists among the state courts institutional characteristics. This study explores adherence to stare decisis by examining judicial decisions to overrule precedent in the fifty state supreme courts. Overruling decisions constitute the most extreme deviation from the norm of stare decisis. As a consequence, developing systematic information about overruling behavior will substantially enhance our understanding of judges willingness to adhere to the norm. We shall develop and test hypotheses concerning the development of the norm of stare decisis based upon a simple model of judicial behavior derived from the game of prisoners dilemma. This model focuses on the trade-off judges must make between embodying their own policy preferences in the law and following their predecessors decisions. From this theoretical base, we will derive hypotheses concerning the relationship between overruling behavior and a host of institutional variables such as court size, caseload, docket control, term length, selection method, and membership change. To evaluate these hypotheses, we propose to gather data on overruling decisions in the fifty state supreme courts over the period of their histories. This will produce a comprehensive database of all overruled and overruling cases decided by each state Supreme Court. Using these data, and employing a variety of statistical methods including event count modeling, we will evaluate the connection between these state supreme courts institutional characteristics and their propensity to overrule their own precedent (and consequently destabilize the rule of law). We hope to determine that state supreme court justices are more inclined to overrule their brethrens (or former brethrens) opinions in (1) systems in which the justices are elected and (2) systems with shorter term lengths. If we are successful, the results will be consistent with the game theoretic model presented in our proposal, which rests upon the notion that judges are rational actors who will pursue their own policy objectives unless they are otherwise constrained by their institutional environment. Where judges work in an environment that promotes inter-judge cooperation and the opportunity for retribution in the event a judge defects, it fosters the stability of precedent and hence the rule of law.