Speed and Efficiency in Government Procurement of Transportation-Related Construction Services

在政府采购军队建筑服务、应对自然灾害和建设交通基础设施方面，更快地执行合同越来越重要。然而，尽管存在明显的需求，但学术文献很少关注速度作为契约机制设计的一个因素。这并不完全令人惊讶，因为当涉及多个因素时，不可能找到适用于所有情况的简单规则。因此，拟议研究的重点是涉及国家运输部(交通部)采购建筑服务的具体但重要的一类问题。与交通相关的建设是一项重要的经济活动；2006年头5个月，50个州每月在公路和街道建设上的支出平均超过720亿美元。几乎所有这些服务都是由承包商提供的。各州DOTS一直在使用各种实验程序来实现更快的合同执行，而没有进行正式分析或证明成本效益。由于存在关于原材料价格和工作范围的重大不确定性，以及信息不对称，这一问题进一步复杂化。拟议的研究将侧重于开发数学模型，以帮助DOTS评估正在使用的实验性合同机制，优化合同参数，并确定在不增加道德风险的情况下更公平地分担风险的合同条款。这个项目中的智力挑战源于需要同时应用经济学(博弈论、激励合同和拍卖)、运筹学(随机建模和优化)和工程学(成本估计)的概念来改进建筑服务合同。更广泛的影响将是双重的。对工程学教育的贡献将来自对博士生的培训和为在职工程师开发短期课程(与明尼苏达大学交通研究中心合作)。该项目得到了明尼苏达州DOT的大力支持，PI将利用这一支持向全国DOT建设工程师社区展示使用最佳合同参数的价值。这将有助于改善DOT工程师构建合同的方式。

Speedier contract execution is increasingly important in government procurement of construction services for the military, in response to natural disasters, and in the building of transportation infrastructure. However, in spite of a demonstrable need, academic literature has paid little attention to speed as a factor in contract mechanism design. This is not entirely surprising because when multiple factors are involved, it is not possible to find simple rules that will be optimal for all situations. The focus of the proposed research is therefore on specific but important class of problems dealing with procurement of construction services by state DOTs (Departments of Transportation). Transportation-related construction is a significant economic activity; monthly spending by the 50 states on highway and street construction has averaged over 72 billion dollars during the first 5 months of 2006. Nearly all of these services are performed by contractors. State DOTs have been using a variety of experimental procedures to realize speedier contract execution, without the benefit of formal analysis or proof of cost effectiveness. The problem is further complicated by the presence of significant uncertainty about raw material prices and scope of work, as well as informational asymmetry. The proposed research will focus on developing mathematical models to help DOTs evaluate experimental contracting mechanisms in use, optimize contract parameters, and identify contract clauses that divide risk more equitably without increasing moral hazard. Intellectual challenges in this project stem from the need to simultaneously apply concepts from economics (game theory, incentive contracts, & auctions), operations research (stochastic modeling & optimization), and engineering (cost estimation) to improve contracts for construction services. Broader impacts will be twofold. Contributions to engineering education will come from the training of a doctoral candidate and via the development of short courses for working engineers (in collaboration with the University of Minnesota's Center for Transportation Studies). This project has the strong support of the Minnesota DOT, which will be leveraged by the PI to demonstrate the value of using optimal contract parameters to the national community of state-DOT construction engineers. This will help improve how contracts are structured by DOT engineers.