Economic Mechanisms for Dynamic Resource Patitioning in Multi-Core Processors
Economic Mechanisms for Dynamic Resource Patitioning in Multi-Core Processors
批准号:
0702275
负责人:
Gabriel Loh
金额:
$17.27万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2007
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2007-09-15 至 2010-08-31
中文摘要
现代微处理器包含多个计算元件(核心),可以并行执行不同的计算。 然而,这样的多核处理器必须共享某些硬件资源(例如,高速缓存、总线带宽、功率)。 当前的多核实现方式不提供对共享资源的任何显式管理,从而导致“自由”行为,其中一些核可以消耗共享资源的大的且不公平的部分。 这种无纪律的方法可能导致其他核心的严重性能下降,甚至降低整体/聚合系统性能。 该项目提出了适应的想法和技术,从网上/互联网拍卖管理共享资源的多核处理器。 其核心思想是,通过为每个核心提供有限的预算,所有核心都将“很好地发挥作用”,因为没有一个核心能够控制共享资源的不公平部分。 此外,每个核心都可以智能地竞标它将从中受益最多的资源,从而提高每个核心和整体系统性能。 利用现有的在线拍卖算法的另一个优点是,重要的分析已经证明了这些算法的各种属性,从而为所提出的多核资源管理技术提供了强大的理论基础。
英文摘要
Modern microprocessors contain multiple computing elements (cores) that can perform different computations in parallel. Such multi-core processors, however, must share certain hardware resources (e.g., caches, bus bandwidth, power). Current multi-core implementations do not provide any explicit management of the shared resources, thereby resulting in "free-for-all" behaviors where some cores can consume a large and unfair portion of the shared resources. Such an undisciplined approach can lead to severe performance degradations for the other cores, and even lower overall/aggregate system performance. This project proposes to adapt ideas and techniques from online/Internet auctions to manage shared resources in multi-core processors. The central idea is that by providing each core with a limited budget, all cores will "play nicely" since no single core will be able to take control of an unfair portion of the shared resources. Furthermore, each core can intelligently bid on the resources that it will benefit the most from, leading to improved per-core and overall system performance. An additional advantage of leveraging existing online auction algorithms is that significant analysis has already gone into proving various properties of these algorithms, thereby providing a strong theoretical foundation for the proposed multi-core resource management techniques.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
CAREER: Computer Architecture Foundations for 3D-Integrated High-Performance Microprocessors
-
批准号:0643500
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$40.0万
-
财政年份:2007
-
负责人:Gabriel Loh
-
依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Exploring the Intrinsic Mechanisms of CEO Turnover and Market
-
批准号:--
-
项目类别:外国学者研究基金
-
资助金额:--
-
批准年份:2024
-
负责人:HAOFEI Z
-
依托单位:
Exploring the Intrinsic Mechanisms of CEO Turnover and Market Reaction: An Explanation Based on Information Asymmetry
-
批准号:W2433169
-
项目类别:外国学者研究基金项目
-
资助金额:--
-
批准年份:2024
-
负责人:HAOFEI ZHANG
-
依托单位: