Supply Chain Engineering

供应链管理分析跨公司行动的协调。传统的供应链模型假设决策者期望利润最大化，并在此假设下分析优化决策的协调机制。然而，最近使用实验室实验的研究表明，实际决策偏离了这些传统模型的预测。在项目的第一阶段，我们详细分析了主要协调机制之一--供应合同。我们研究了在供应链模型的社会背景下，认知限制和决策偏差(如锚定)和动机(如风险和损失厌恶)在个人决策和社会偏好(如公平和信任)中的作用。例如，在我们对服务水平契约的研究中，我们研究了锚定偏差，在我们对批发价契约和预测分享的研究中，我们研究了社会偏好和公平关切在决策中的作用。第一个资助期的结果使我们很好地了解了相关的决策偏见以及自私和社会偏好。大多数结果是通过数学模型结合实验室实验获得的，但我们也使用了现场数据。在项目第二阶段，我们将从两个方向展开研究。在优化供应链合同设计的第一个子项目中，我们将使用从第一阶段获得的见解来设计合同并在现场实施。在一家主要的德国零售商，我们将在随机现场试验中设计和实施服务水平契约。除了分析合同参数对订单决策的影响外，我们还将分析如何对信息进行预处理以减少决策偏差。在一家全球制药公司，我们将再次在随机现场实验中分析销售激励计划对预测的影响。这两个现场实验都将是对理论和实验室结果的重要验证。在第二个关于供应链合同谈判的子项目中，我们将建立数学模型并进行实验室实验，以分析供应链合作伙伴之间的互动。虽然我们已经分析了决策者在项目第一阶段对给定合同的反应，但我们将允许在第二阶段就合同参数进行谈判，并分析谈判协议如何影响结果。我们还将分析当合同不完全时讨价还价协议的效果。该项目第一阶段的结果使我们能够对与供应链管理相关的偏见和偏好有一个坚实的了解。在第二阶段，我们将使用这些见解来设计实际的合同和激励系统，并将分析合同谈判应该如何组织，以提高整体效率。

Supply chain management analyzes the coordination of actions across companies. Traditional supply chain models assume expected profit-maximizing decision makers and analyze coordination mechanisms that optimize decision making under this assumption. However, recent studies using laboratory experiments suggest that actual decisions deviate from predictions of those traditional models. During the first phase of the project, we have analyzed one of the main coordination mechanisms, supply contracts, in detail. We have studied the role of cognitive limitations and decision biases, such as anchoring, and motivations such as risk- and loss aversion in individual decision making and social preferences, such as fairness and trust, in social contexts for supply chain models. In our research on service level contracts, for instance, we studied the anchoring bias, and in our research on wholesale price contracts and forecast sharing, we studied social preferences and the role of fairness concerns on decision making. The results of the first funding period have provided us with a good understanding of the decision biases and selfish and social preferences that are relevant. Most results were obtained using mathematical models in combination with laboratory experiments, but we also used field data. During the second phase of the project, we will extend our research in two directions. In the first subproject on optimizing supply chain contract design, we will use the insights that we have gained from the first phase to design contracts and implement them in the field. At a major German retailer, we will design and implement a service level contract in a randomized field experiment. Besides analyzing the effect of contract parameters on order decisions, we will analyze how information should be pre-processed to reduce decision biases. At a global pharmaceutical company, we will analyze the effect of the sales incentive scheme on forecasting, again in a randomized field experiment. Both field experiments will be an important validation of theoretical and laboratory results. In the second subproject on supply chain contract negotiations, we will build mathematical models and conduct laboratory experiments to analyze the interaction between supply chain partners. While we have analyzed how decisions makers respond to given contracts in the first phase of the project, we will allow for negotiation on the contract parameters in the second phase and analyze how negotiation protocols affect the outcomes. We will also analyze the effect of bargaining protocols when contracts are incomplete. The results of the first phase of the project have allowed us to gain a solid understanding of the biases and preferences that are relevant in supply chain management. In the second phase, we will use the insights to engineer actual contracts and incentive systems and we will analyze how negotiations of contracts should be structured to improve overall efficiency.