New Developments in Social Choice and Bargaining Theory: Welfarism and Incomplete Information

本研究项目有两个主要目标。首先，它通过放弃福利主义假设，为社会选择和讨价还价理论中的一些经典解决方案提供了经济学基础。 其次，它提出了将这两个理论扩展到不完全信息问题的可能方法。公理化谈判和社会选择的大多数贡献都是在效用中表达的。因此，人们通常隐含地假设，如果两个问题在效用空间中重合，那么它们必须有相同的解。不幸的是，这一福利主义假设缺乏明确的规范性和实证性内容，因此难以作为公理接受。这个研究项目提供了一个更好的基础，社会选择和公理讨价还价的特点，在非福利主义的环境中的一些主要解决方案。信息问题一直被认为是经济理论的核心。然而，它们对合作的影响仍然没有得到很好的理解。因此，Aumann教授在2000年对博弈论学会的主席演讲中将这一主题列为未来研究的重要方向。更准确地说，已经有大量的工作致力于了解哪些合同在不对称信息下是可行的，参见。机械设计理论。教授赫维茨，马斯金和迈尔森被授予2007年瑞典央行经济科学奖，以纪念阿尔弗雷德·诺贝尔对这一主题的开创性贡献。然而，在可行的合同中，应该或将选择哪种具体合同，人们知之甚少。本项目研究了将讨价还价和社会选择理论扩展到不完全信息的许多不同途径。社会选择和公理化讨价还价理论被广泛应用，但其所基于的福利主义假设在没有正当理由的情况下并不令人信服。目前的研究项目将展示如何一些经典的公理系统可以完成，以获得福利主义的解决方案，在非福利主义的框架。到目前为止，在不完全信息下的社会选择和讨价还价方面做的工作很少，但显然需要超越对可行性的简单描述。更广泛的影响：这项研究建议是其重点的基础。考虑的问题的重要性意味着它可能对许多不同的实际经济问题产生重大影响。在不完全信息下的规范性分析应指导经济和社会辩论，例如关于公共健康保险、税收或费用分摊的辩论。这项研究的一部分将与其他三所大学的研究人员合作开发：Camelia Bejan（莱斯大学），大卫佩雷斯-卡斯特里略（西班牙巴塞罗那自治大学）和大卫维特斯坦（以色列本古里安大学）。该研究项目的结果将纳入研究员在布朗大学教授的关于信息、风险和不确定性的研究生课程。

This research project has two main objectives. First, it offers an economic foundation of some classical solutions in the theories of social choice and bargaining by dropping the welfarist assumption. Second, it suggests possible ways of extending these two theories to problems with incomplete information.Most contributions in axiomatic bargaining and social choice are phrased in utilities. It is thus assumed, often implicitly, that two problems must have the same solution if they coincide in the utility space. Unfortunately, this welfarist assumption lacks both a clear normative and positive content, and is thus hard to accept as an axiom. This research project offers a better foundation of social choice and axiomatic bargaining by characterizing some of its main solutions in non-welfarist environments.Informational issues have long been recognized as central in economic theory. However, their implications on cooperation are still not yet well understood. Accordingly, Professor Aumann listed this topic as an important direction for future research in his 2000 presidential address to the Game Theory Society. To be more precise, an impressive amount of work has already been devoted to understand which contracts are feasible under asymmetric information, cf. the theory of mechanism design. Professors Hurwicz, Maskin, and Myerson were awarded the 2007 Sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel for their path-breaking contributions on the topic. Yet very little is known about what specific contract, among those that are feasible, should or will be chosen. This project investigates many different avenues to extend the theories of bargaining and social choice to incomplete information.The theories of social choice and axiomatic bargaining are widely applied, yet the welfarist assumption on which it is founded is not compelling without justification. The present research project will show how some classical axiomatic systems can be completed to derive welfarist solutions in non-welfarist frameworks. Very little work has been done so far on social choice and bargaining under incomplete information, yet there is a clear need of going beyond the mere description of what is feasible.Broader Impact: This research proposal is foundational in its focus. The importance of the questions considered implies that it could have a significant impact on many different practical economic problems. The normative analysis under incomplete information should guide the economic and social debates, concerning, for instance, public health insurance, taxes, or cost sharing. Part of this research will be developed in collaboration with researchers from three other universities: Camelia Bejan (Rice U), David Perez-Castrillo (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain), and David Wettstein (Ben Gurion University, Israel). The results of this research project will be integrated into a graduate-level course on information, risk and uncertainty that the investigator teaches at Brown University.