Seeking, storing and supplying information: Information and memory in behavioral Economics
Seeking, storing and supplying information: Information and memory in behavioral Economics
批准号:
0919955
负责人:
Kareen Rozen
金额:
$12.53万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2009
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2009-09-15 至 2013-08-31
中文摘要
该奖项用于行为经济学理论的研究。第一个项目开发和分析了一种团队合作模式,在这种模式下,团队成员共同完成昂贵但具有社会价值的任务。在此模型中,团队成员记忆完成任务所需信息的能力有限。因此,该团队不仅必须在他们的行动中进行合作,而且还必须在建立集体记忆方面进行合作。如果一名成员忘记了她完成工作所需的关键信息,另一名团队成员必须介入并进行提醒。然而,这创造了一个战略性的情况;如果我没有提醒我的队友,整个团队的生产力较低,但与我的同事相比,我会显得表现得很好。第二个项目开发了一个框架,用于检查对客观信息的偏好。在该模型中,经济主体具有关于影响特定决策结果的重要条件的不完全信息。这项研究将测试的概念正式化为一种信息结构,与组成信息结构的事件的概率分布的集合配对,条件是世界的每一种状态。PI和她的合作者建立了一个效用表示,其中当信息用于解决非退化决策问题时,决策者显示选择性的信息搜索。根据她的目标在世界不同国家的冲突情况,决策者可能希望通过模糊她对真实状态的了解或收集更准确的信息来减轻决策问题的难度。
英文摘要
This award funds research in behavioral economic theory. The first project develops and analyzes a model of teamwork where team members work together to complete costly but socially valuable tasks. In this model, team members have limited ability to remember information they need to complete their tasks. The team must therefore cooperate not just in their actions, but also in building a collective memory. If one member has forgotten key information she needs to complete her part of the job, another team member must step in with a reminder. However, this creates a strategic situation; if I fail to remind my teammate, the team as a whole is less productive, but I will appear to be a strong performer when compared to my co-worker.The second project develops a framework for examining preferences for objective information. In this model, an economic agent has incomplete information about important conditions that affect the results of a specific decision. The research formalizes the idea of a test as an information structure paired with a collection of probability distributions, conditional on each state of the world, over the events comprising the information structure. The PI and her collaborator build a utility representation in which the decision maker displays selective information seeking when information is used towards resolving a nondegenerate decision problem. Depending on how her objectives conflict in different states of the world, a decision maker may wish to mitigate the difficulty of her decision problem by obscuring her knowledge of the true state or gathering more accurate information.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Non-Binding Suggestions, Self-Enforcing Norms and the Determinants of Cooperation in Repeated Games
-
批准号:2214603
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$41.16万
-
财政年份:2022
-
负责人:Kareen Rozen
-
依托单位:
Communication, Perception, and Strategic Obfuscation
-
批准号:1559398
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$24.17万
-
财政年份:2016
-
负责人:Kareen Rozen
-
依托单位:
海外基金