Collaborative Research: Dynamic Perspectives on Costs and Conflict in Signaling Interactions

信号传导是一种非常基本的生物现象。它存在于几乎所有层次的生物组织中，在几乎所有的生物过程中起着至关重要的作用。尽管这些过程包含非常多样化的现象，但它们的结构有一个共同的核心：至少有一个发送方与至少一个接收方进行交互。这让我们能够运用博弈论的数学理论，这是一种战略互动的抽象理论。本项目的目标是通过使用进化博弈论的方法来确定信号相互作用的稳定进化结果。尽管信令的一些特性已经被很好地理解，但我们对动态过程中如何出现可靠的信令的了解是有限的，特别是在发送方和接收方之间存在重大利益冲突的情况下。如果传递所有相关信息不符合发送方的利益，如何才能实现可靠的信令？这个问题是生物学中大量问题的核心。它在许多经济互动中也起着非常突出的作用。该项目将为广泛的研究项目提供重要的新结果，并将为实验和实地研究开辟未知的道路。该项目包括对本科生和研究生的培训以及教育工具的开发。

Signaling is a very basic biological phenomenon. It is present at almost all levels of biological organization and it plays a crucial role in nearly all biological processes. Although these processes comprise a very diverse set of phenomena, there is a common core to their structure: at least one sender interacts with at least one receiver. This allows one to apply the mathematical theory of games, which is an abstract theory of strategic interactions. The goal of this project is to identify stable evolutionary outcomes of signaling interactions by using methods from evolutionary game theory. Although some properties of signaling are well understood, our knowledge of how reliable signaling emerges in a dynamic process is limited, especially in cases where there is substantial conflict of interest between a sender and a receiver. If it is not in the sender's interest to transfer all relevant information, how can reliable signaling be achieved? This question is at the heart of a huge number of problems in biology. It also plays a very prominent role in many economic interactions. This project will provide important new results for a wide array of research programs and will open up unknown paths for experiments and field studies. The project involves the training of undergraduate and graduate students and the development of educational tools.