Doctoral Dissertation in Political Science: Signal Costs and Public Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy

这个项目解决了各州如何传达外交政策动机，以及公众如何感知信号。它测试了不同信号机制的逻辑：防御性军事政策、针对少数群体的国内政策、对机构机构的参与，以及包括对外援助在内的“软”外交政策。这些信令机制大多基于代价高昂的信令逻辑，即传递有关动机的可信信息的行动，因为它们对发送者来说代价高昂。国家可以发出善意的信号，例如，在进攻性技术具有优势的时候，通过投资防御性军事技术。由于进行这项投资的成本和风险很高，动机更激进的参与者不太可能采取这一行动，在这种情况下购买国防将使政府能够传达其善意。该项目考察了昂贵信号的逻辑是否足以可信地传达国家的偏好。这项研究的智力价值集中在其理论和方法贡献上。该项目将有助于了解各国的动机和IR中代价高昂的信号：动机在安全事务中是否以及何时重要，以及一个国家如何传达其动机。本研究试图从三个方面扩展对动机和信号传递的理解。首先，它通过经验检验相互竞争的理论，解决了关于动机作用的争论。其次，该项目通过检查各种信号机制在传达国家动机方面的有效性，来测试代价高昂的信号传递的逻辑。第三，这项研究测试了一种新的机制，即对外援助政策和维和活动，从来没有被认为是可以表明国家动机的信号。另一项贡献是方法论。该项目在微观层面上提供了关于昂贵信号逻辑的经验证据。以前对代价高昂的信号传递的案例研究一直无法清楚地区分因果。调查实验可以克服这一障碍，并将使研究人员能够确定国家行动(信号)与观察这些行动的外国公众态度之间的明确因果关系。这项研究有可能对安全政策界产生更广泛的影响。这项研究将向决策者推荐政策选项，并建议通过向其他州传达本国政府的偏好来加强国家安全的行动。该项目将提供基本信息，说明哪些类型的政策在安抚潜在对手方面是有效的，以及在多大程度上有效。此外，这项研究的结果也将适用于社会心理学、经济学、商业和政治学等领域。从根本上讲，这个项目是关于在两个或更多的各方之间传达一个人的意图：演员如何使他们的信号可信。这项研究将使学者们能够检查这种交流中的态度形成。这项研究将为这些学科提供关于如何使沟通更有效和更高效的经验教训。

This project addresses how states communicate foreign policy motives, and how signals are perceived by the public. It tests the logic of different signaling mechanisms: defensive military policies, domestic policies towards minority groups, involvement in institutional institutions, and 'soft' foreign policies including foreign assistance. Most of these signaling mechanisms are based on the logic of costly signaling, actions that convey credible information about motives because they are costly for the sender to take. States can signal benign motives, for example, by investing in defensive military technology when offensive technology has the advantage. Because making this investment is costly and risky, and actors with more aggressive motives would be unlikely to take this action, buying defense in this scenario allows the state to communicate its benign intent. The project examines whether the logic of costly signaling is sufficient for credible communications of states' preferences.The intellectual merit of this research centers on its theoretical and methodological contributions. The project will contribute to knowledge about states' motives and costly signaling in IR: whether and when motives matter in security affairs, and how a state can communicate its motives. The study attempts to expand the understanding of motives and signaling in three ways. First, it addresses debates over the role of motives by empirically testing competing theories. Second, the project tests the logic of costly signaling by examining the effectiveness of various signaling mechanisms in conveying a state's motives. Third, the study tests a new mechanism, foreign aid policies and peace-keeping activities, that has never been considered as a signal that can indicate states' motives. A separate contribution is methodological. The project provides empirical evidence at the micro-level on the logic of costly signaling. Previous case study research on costly signaling has been unable to clearly distinguish between cause and effect. Survey experiments can overcome this obstacle, and will allow researchers to identify a clear causal relationship between states' actions (signals) and the attitude of the foreign public that observes those actions.This research has the potential to have a broader impact on the security policy community. The study will recommend policy options to decision-makers, and suggest actions to increase national security by conveying their government's preferences to other states. The project will provide basic information on which types of policies are effective in reassuring a potential adversary and to what extent. Additionally, the findings of this research will also be applicable to areas such as social psychology, economics, business, and political science. The project is, fundamentally, about the communication of one's intentions between two or more parties: how actors can make their signals credible. This research will allow scholars to examine attitude formation from such communications. This study will provide lessons to those disciplines on how we can make communication more effective and efficient.