EAGER: Legal Barriers to Securing the Routing Architecture

IP地址可能被窃取或劫持。它可以立即发生，并可能导致失去互联网连接和/或将流量分流到恶意实体。直到最近，一个组织还无法证明其互联网地址的所有权。全球资源公钥基础设施(RPKI)是一个框架，旨在通过允许第三方以加密方式验证互联网地址块的所有权声明并允许这些资源持有者声明路由关系来保护互联网的路由基础设施。然而，RPKI的采用仍处于僵局，这主要是由于法律因素。该项目支持对相关各方(如网络运营商)使用RPKI的责任进行适当分配的独立评估，作为各方讨论解决中继方协议(RPA)中赔偿条款僵局的基础。如果这些讨论成功，研究将最终促进RPKI在北美的更广泛使用，并实现更安全的互联网。BGP是一种实时分布式协议，横跨全球，在数百万台路由器上运行，互连60,000个不同的管理域，称为自治系统(AS)，并向700,000个目的地网络提供路由信息。BGP最初是在安全性不是很重要的问题的时代设计的，主要的BGP路由更改由运营商通过电子邮件或社区邮件列表传达。然而，互联网呈指数级增长，在过去的十年中，全球BGP路由系统的系统性漏洞一直是网络运营商关注的主题。RPKI为这个问题提供了一种解决方案。然而，采用RPKI来保护BGP路由的最大障碍之一是大多数组织不会或不能签署ARIN的RPKI依赖协议。通过进行法律分析，并促成一种新形式的协议和妥协，就可以在互联网基础设施的这一重要基本组成部分上取得进展。

IP addresses can be stolen or hijacked. It can happen instantly, and may result in a loss of Internet connectivity and/or diversion of traffic to a malicious entity. Until recently, an organization was unable to prove ownership of its Internet address. A global Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a framework designed to secure the Internet's routing infrastructure by enabling Third parties to cryptographically validate claims of ownership of Internet address blocks and permit such resource holders to declare routing relationships. However, adoption of RPKI remains at an impasse largely due to legal factors. This project supports an independent assessment of the proper allocation of liability for uses of RPKI by related parties, such as network operators, that can serve as the basis for the parties to discuss resolving the impasse over the indemnification clauses in the Relaying Party Agreement (RPA). If those discussions are successful, the research will ultimately promote more widespread use of RPKI in North America and enable a more secure Internet.BGP is a live distributed protocol which spans the globe, operating on millions of routers, interconnecting 60,000 distinct administrative domains, called Autonomous Systems (AS), and providing routing information to 700,000 destination networks. BGP was originally designed in an era in which security was not a significant concern, and major BGP route changes were communicated by operators via email or community mailing lists. However, the Internet has grown exponentially and the systemic vulnerabilities of the global BGP routing system have been the subject of concern for network operators for the last decade. RPKI provides one solution to the problem. One of the largest obstacles to the adoption of RPKI to secure BGP routing, however, is the fact that most organizations will not or cannot sign ARIN's RPKI Relying Agreement. By conducting a legal analysis and enabling a new form of agreement and compromise, progress forward can be made on this important underlying component of the Internet infrastructure.