Political Oversight of the Ministerial Bureaucracy from the Perspective of Principal-Agent-Theory. Institutional Design, formal Models and laboratory-experimental Examination.

本项目的目标是基于委托代理理论，正式确定不同制度设计对政治家和部级官僚之间委托关系的影响，并在一系列实验室实验中检验这些模型的经验有效性。基于这些预测，我们认为个人动机和重复互动是授权情境中合作行为的潜在来源。政治领导人和部级官员之间的关系被描述为以信息不对称为特征的授权关系。委托代理理论通过为自利官僚建立激励相容的制度环境，将分析重点从公共政策的有效实施转移到政策的有效实施上。这种调整成功的关键是委托代理学者所做的动机假设的有效性。与理性自利行为者的范式相反，在当前文献中，关于重复互动背景下的委托代理星座的官僚个体动机和合作解决方案都是有争议的。这个项目关注的问题是，委托代理理论是否为政治和官僚领导人在授权情况下的行为提供了可靠的解释。授权关系的制度设计、个人动机和重复互动如何影响官僚服务的提供？要回答这些问题，我们将分三个步骤进行。在Shikano&Tepe(2012)以前工作的基础上，通过三个正式模型(变式1：单一委托人和意识形态代理人；变式2：单一代理人和意识形态委托人；变式3：带有意识形态委托人的委托链)，将一般委托代理框架转移并应用于部长和国务秘书之间的授权关系的具体细节。在第二步中，这些形式模型在假设完全理性的个人的情况下进行解析求解。在第三步中，从这三个模型中得出的博弈论预测在一系列的实验室实验中被验证。在其他实验室实验中获得的经验证据倾向于挑战完全理性个体的假设。为了评估博弈论预测和实验结果之间的差异在多大程度上可以归因于个人的工作动机和主体池效应，我们采取了两种方法。首先，在实验结束后，我们测量了受试者的公共服务动机。其次，国家各部委的公务员利用移动计算机实验室进行实验。

The goal of this project is to formalize the impact of different institutional designs of the delegation relationship between politicians and ministerial bureaucrats based on the principal-agent theory and to examine the empirical validity of these models in series of laboratory experiments. Against these predictions, we consider individual motives and repeated interaction as potential sources for cooperative behavior in delegation situations.The relationship between political leaders and ministerial bureaucrats has been described as a delegation relationship characterized by information asymmetries. Principal-agent theory shifts the analytical focus from the effective implementation of public policies towards the efficient implementation of policies by establishing incentive-compatible institutional environments for self-interested bureaucrats. Crucial to the success of this realignment is the validity of the motivational assumptions made by principal-agent scholars. Contrary to the paradigm of rational self-interested actors, both, bureaucrats individual motivation and cooperative solutions of principal-agent constellations in the context of repeated interaction are discussed controversially in the current literature. This project focusses on the question of whether the principal-agent theory provides a reliable explanation for the behavior of political and bureaucratic leaders in delegation situations. How does the institutional design of the delegation relationship, individual motives and repeated interaction affect bureaucratic service delivery? To answer these questions, we will proceed in three steps. Building on previous work by Shikano & Tepe (2012), the general principal-agent framework is transferred and applied to the specifics of the delegation relationship between ministers and secretaries of state in three formal models (Variant 1: a single principal and ideological agents; Variant 2: a single agent and ideological principals; Variant 3: delegation chain with ideological principals). In the second step, these formal models are solved analytically assuming fully rational individuals. In the third step, the game theoretical predictions derived from these three models are tested in series of laboratory experiments on student subject pools.Empirical evidence, gained in other laboratory experiments, tends to challenge the assumption of fully rational individuals. In order to assess the extent to which differences between the game-theoretical prediction and the experimental results can be attributed to individual work motives and subject-pool-effects, we take a twofold approach. First, we measure the Public Service Motivation of our subjects after the experimental sessions. Second, the experimental sessions are conducted with civil servants from state ministries using a mobile computer laboratory.