The Allocation of Talent to Finance: Welfare, Growth, and Employment Effects

最近的金融动荡及其对宏观经济的影响引发了关于金融交易社会效益的讨论。在政策层面，讨论的中心是如何在明确的安全网和隐含的国家担保的情况下遏制银行过度冒险的问题。虽然这个问题的重要性怎么估计都不过分，但还有一个不同的问题，对长期增长和经济福利可能同样重要，即，金融业吸引了太多的人才，这可能会在不同的职业中产生更大的社会效益。本研究的目的是从理论上探讨在何种情况下人才配置过度。为此，我们基于格罗斯曼和斯蒂格利茨（Grossman and Stiglitz，1980）的噪音理性预期均衡模型开发了一个新模型，在该模型中，专门从事金融的代理人提高了信息效率，但代价是他们没有为生产做出贡献。真实的产出。我们研究了职业选择对代理人福利以及宏观经济增长，生产部门工资和就业的影响。

The recent financial turbulence and its macroeconomic repercussions have sparked a discussion about the social benefits of financial trading. At the policy level, the discussion centers around the question of how to contain excessive risk taking by banks in view of explicit safety nets and implicit state guarantees. While the significance of this question cannot be overestimated, there is a different concern, which might be of equal importance for long-term growth and economic welfare, viz., that the financial sector attracts too much talent, which could produce larger social benefits in different occupations. The purpose of the proposed project is to investigate theoretically under which circumstances the allocation of talent to finance is excessive. To do so, we develop a new model, based on the noisy rational expectations equilibrium model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), in which agents who specialize in finance promote informational efficiency, but at the cost that they do not contribute to the production of real output. We study the impact of occupational choice on agents' welfare as well as on macroeconomic growth, production sector wages, and employment.