Human Dignity and Minimal Subsistence: The Possibilities of Legitimation and Limitation of a Normative Minimal Standard

在确定不同生活领域中相互行为期望的许多最低标准中，有一些具有最高的法律和道德相关性。在法律话语中，构成基本权利不可侵犯的“核心内容”的人的尊严的概念--在其他方面受法律限制的权利--经常发挥作用。以此类推，一系列伦理哲学概念借鉴了人的尊严原则，以标明在道德领域内需要特别关注的核心道德主张，如人权。尽管人的尊严的概念受到了所有批评，但在具体的论证中，人的尊严显然被认为具有双重规范功能：一方面，这一概念旨在作为规范性最低标准的“来源”或合法化基础；另一方面，它也被期望以合理的方式限制伴随而来的主张的类型和范围。对社会和法律-政治争议的许多贡献，以及对生物伦理争议的贡献，都利用了这种分层功能，至少是含蓄的。到目前为止，道德哲学辩论主要围绕着利用人的尊严原则得出基本权利或为之辩护的问题。然而，随着“人的尊严”被更明确地解释为社会参与权的根基，限制这类权利的相反问题变得更加紧迫。尽管这类诉求由于其结构上的模糊性仍然被认为是第二优先事项，但德国联邦宪法法院在2010年和2012年开辟了一条新的道路，在宪法中确立了保障人道最低生活保障的主观权利。本研究以此为契机，以人的最低生存为例，在与当前相关哲学概念的比较研究中，厘清人的尊严概念的层次性。同时，还应对在各种既定解释中理解人的尊严原则作出一般贡献，以揭示其影响，并进一步提高其在伦理和法律适用方面的透明度。

Of the many minimal standards that determine mutual behavioral expectations in different spheres of life, some are of the highest legal and moral relevance. In legal discourse a concept of human dignity that constitutes the inviolable 'core content' of fundamental rights - rights that are in other aspects legally restrictable - frequently comes into play. Analogically, a series of philosophical conceptions of ethics draw on the principle of human dignity in order to mark out a core of moral claims that demand particular regard within the moral sphere, such as human rights. Despite all the criticism regarding the idea of human dignity, in specific argumentation contexts human dignity is evidently given credit for a twofold normative function: on one hand this idea is intended to serve as a 'source' or legitimizing foundation for normative minimal standards; on the other hand it is also expected to restrict the type and scope of the concomitant claims in a rational manner. Many contributions to socio- and legal-political controversies, but also to bioethical ones, draw on this stratification function, at least implicitly. So far the moral-philosophical debate has been revolving primarily around the derivation or justification of basic rights using the principle of human dignity. The reverse problem, however, of limiting such rights becomes more urgent as 'human dignity' becomes more distinctly interpreted as grounding the rights of social participation. Even though this type of claims is still considered a second priority precisely because of their structural vagueness, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany opened a new path in 2010 and 2012 by constitutionally establishing a subjective right to a guaranteed humane minimal subsistence. The research project takes this development as an imputes to make clear the stratifying capability of the concept of human dignity in a comparative study of relevant current philosophical conceptions by using the example of humane minimal existence. At the same time, a general contribution is to be made to the understanding of the principle of human dignity in its established variants of interpretations, to uncover its implications, and to further the transparency of its ethical and legal application.