Re-evaluating Minority Shareholding in Competition Law Against the Background of Horizontal Shareholding by Investors: Lessons Drawn From Fintech and E-Commerce Startups in Asia

研究成果是双重的。首先，实证研究表明，风险资本家经常干预被投资人的公司战略。在Ola和优步的案例中，这一点最为明显。作为这两家公司的投资者，软银一直在敦促Ola与优步合并。软银还试图促成Flipkart和SnapDeal的合并。还有消息称，软银正在推动优步和Grab在东南亚的合并。这些精心设计的合并提出了一个问题，即是否不应该重新考虑杀手级收购的概念，而不是通过收购来扼杀横向股东或普通股所有者的竞争。第二，理论研究侧重于平静生活理论，解释了横向持股或共同持股会提高价格或限制产品选择的原因。这一理论的有趣之处在于，它还被用来解释经济体制内部的弱点，尽管经济体制涉及交叉持股。矛盾的是，为了解决这种平静的生活，公司法改革已经出台，而这些改革反过来又导致了共同所有权的产生。这引发了一个问题，即公司法是否适合解决共同所有制的负面后果。

The research achievements are twofold. First, the empirical research has shown that venture capitalists have intervened often in the investees' corporate strategies. This has been most obvious in the case of Ola and Uber. Being investor in both firms, Softbank has been urging Ola to merge with Uber. Softbank also tried to engineer a merger between Flipkart and Snapdeal. There is also information that it was Softbank pushing for the merger between Uber and Grab in South-East Asia. These engineered mergers beg the question whether the concept of killer acquisitions should not be reconsidered towards acquisitions to kill competition by a horizontal shareholder or common owner. Second, the theoretical research has focused on the theory of "quiet life" to explain the reason why horizontal shareholding or common ownership could raise prices or limit product choice. The interesting part of this theory is that it has also been used to explain weaknesses within the keiretsu structure, despite the keiretsu being about cross-ownership. The paradox is that to tackle the quiet life, corporate law reforms have been introduced and these in turn led to the creation of common ownership. This triggers the question on the appropriateness of corporate law to tackle negative outcomes of common ownership.