Dynamic Information Revelation

这个项目的目标是调查价格在传递卖家拥有的私人信息方面的作用。我将分析卖家拥有其商品私人信息的市场，例如，房地产市场或某些金融资产的市场。在这样的市场中，卖家会随着时间的推移设定他们商品的价格，直到价格被一些买家接受。卖家可以利用他们的价格选择来传递关于他们私人信息的信息，因此买家可以根据观察到的价格来决定他们的决定。我的调查将集中在开发一个理论模型，以调查卖家如何选择价格来传递或隐藏有关其产品的信息，以及这种信息传递是如何受到市场特征的影响的。因此，我希望对如何以最佳方式监管市场，以最大限度地减少信息不对称的负面影响获得经济见解。正如一些市场在最近的金融危机中所经历的那样，信息不对称可能会减缓甚至冻结贸易。

The goal of this project is to investigate the role of prices in transmitting private information possessed by sellers. I will analyze markets where sellers possess private information about their goods such as, for example, the housing market or markets for some financial assets. In such markets, sellers set the price of their goods over time until the price is accepted by some buyer. The sellers may use their price choice to transmit information about their private information, and therefore the buyers may condition their decisions on the observed prices. My investigation will focus on developing a theoretical model to investigate how sellers choose the price to transmit or hide information about their products, and how such information transmission is shaped by the characteristics of the market. As a result, I expect to gain economic insights into how to optimally regulate markets to minimize the negative effects of the information asymmetries that, as some markets experienced in the recent financial crisis, may slow down or even freeze trade.