Conglomerate Mergers

完成了题为“在生产受到限制的竞争性联合企业中的代理问题”的文件。建立了一个具有生产约束的竞争企业集团逆向选择模型。它充分刻画了第一和第二最好的合同。当生产约束使得第一最佳结果无法实现时，第二最佳契约是分离或联营。它采用离散时间，无限时域的理论模型来分析垄断企业的多元化和剥离行为。在新市场的需求价值仍然很高的时期，企业集团收购一家公司并保持合并。 否则，企业集团将间歇性地进行合并和剥离。

The paper "Agency problems in a competitive conglomerate with production constraints" was completed. The study develops an adverse selection model of a competing conglomerate with production constraints. It fully characterize the first and the second-best contracts. When the production constraints make the first best outcome unattainable, the second-best contract is either separating or pooling.The paper "Conglomerate merger and divestment dynamics" was completed. It employs a discrete-time, infinite horizon theoretical model to analyze the diversifying and divesting behavior of a monopolist. The conglomerate acquires a firm and stays merged in periods where the value of the demand of the new market remains high. Otherwise, the conglomerate will merge and divest intermittently.