Opinion Dynamics with Rational Agents

动态舆论形成是现代社会的一个重要方面。在互联网平台和社交媒体的时代，舆论动态对社会和政治问题产生了重大影响。在这种背景下，代理人可获得的信息量对意见形成的动态产生了至关重要的影响。观点动力学是当前算法博弈论中的一个有趣的领域。在这个项目中，我们对标准意见形成模型背景下的一些重要算法问题感兴趣。在项目的第二阶段，我们研究了由于可用信息的限制和代理的反复无常的行为所产生的问题，缺乏协调和异步动态的影响，以及动态环境中的意见形成。此外，我们对信息设计的影响感兴趣，即信息提供者发出战略信号。我们的主要目标是刻画(亚)稳定状态的存在和结构，以及得到动力学收敛时间的可证明的界。此外，我们还将分析用于信息设计的近似算法，并证明相应的近似结果的难度。

Dynamic opinion formation is an important aspect of modern societies. In the age of internet platforms and social media, opinion dynamics have had significant impact on societal and political issues. In this context, the amount of information available to the agents crucially influences the dynamics of opinion formation. Opinion dynamics are a current area of interest in algorithmic game theory. In this project, we are interested in a number of important algorithmic problems in the context of standard opinion formation models. In the second phase of the project, we study questions arising from the restriction of available information and erratic behavior of agents, the influence of lacking coordination and asynchronous dynamics, as well as opinion formation in dynamic environments. In addition, we are interested in the impact of information design, i.e., strategic signaling by information providers. Our main goals are to characterize existence and structure of (meta-)stable states, as well as to derive provable bounds on convergence times for dynamics. Moreover, we will analyze approximation algorithms for information design, and prove corresponding hardness of approximation results.