Thick Concepts and Objectivity

这一研究项目旨在审查某一类规范性概念-所谓的“厚概念”-以期回答道德规范是否可以客观有效的问题，如果可以，在何种意义上有效。“善”或“义务”等抽象概念纯粹是规范性的，而“残忍”、“勇敢”或“忠诚”等抽象概念似乎以某种方式将描述性和规范性内容联合收割机结合在一起。由于这些概念似乎在“是”和“应该”之间建立了一种非常牢固的--如果不是不可分割的--联系，因此有许多20世纪世纪的哲学家（菲丽帕·富特、约翰·麦克道尔和伯纳德·威廉姆斯，仅举几例）诉诸这些概念，以表明价值观和规范可以是客观的。当然，这些思想家并不是唯一为道德客观主义辩护的人，但考虑到我们今天所面临的道德观的多元性和深刻的道德分歧的普遍性，他们对客观规范和价值观问题的浓厚的概念方法似乎特别及时。这些现象使厚概念方法具有可信度的原因是，与薄概念不同，厚概念往往与特定的文化联系在一起。因此，它们提出的问题超出了客观道德规范是否可行的简单问题：考虑到所讨论的“对象”明显的文化依赖性，我们可以敢于希望的那种客观性的问题。这个研究项目的主要目的是为这种道德客观性的方法注入新的活力，因为它最近已经声名狼借。为此，我将首先与怀疑论者接触：那些否认深奥的概念可以揭示道德客观性，或者实际上任何具有哲学意义的东西的人。我想到的这群人是所谓的关于厚的通货紧缩论者，他们否认厚概念的内在规范性。在他们看来，厚概念的意义纯粹是描述性的。因此，对他们来说，这些概念就像任何其他描述性概念一样，无法弥合“是”与“应该”之间的鸿沟。为了反驳这种怀疑，我将仔细研究并批评通缩论者提出的一些主要论点。我期望，除了重新建立厚概念的内在规范性之外，这种批判性的讨论可能会产生某些必要的东西，一个令人满意的厚概念的非通货紧缩解释应该满足这些需要。如果我是正确的，那么下一步就是评估各种现有的非通货紧缩的解释，这些解释是如何在满足上述要求的基础上，把它们的两个方面的意义联合收割机结合起来的。我的假设是推理主义者的解释最好。

This research project aims to examine a certain class of normative concepts – so-called “thick concepts” – with a view to answering the question of whether moral norms can be objectively valid and, if so, in what sense. While thin concepts, like „good“ or „obligatory”, are purely normative, thick concepts, like “cruel”, “courageous” or “loyal”, seem to somehow combine descriptive and normative content. Because of the fact that thick concepts seem to establish a very robust – if not inextricable – link between the is and the ought, there has been a number of 20th century philosophers (Philippa Foot, John McDowell, and Bernard Williams, to name a few) who have appealed to these concepts in order to show that values and norms can be objective. Of course, these thinkers are not alone in defending moral objectivism, but their thick concept approach to the question of objective norms and values seems particularly timely, given the plurality of moral outlooks and the pervasiveness of deep moral disagreement that we confront today. The reason why these phenomena lend credibility to the thick concept approach is that, unlike thin concepts, thick concepts tend to be bound up with specific cultures. As such, they raise questions that go beyond the simple question of whether objective moral norms are viable: questions concerning the kind of objectivity that we can dare to hope for, given the apparent culture-dependence of the “objects” at issue. The main aim of this research project is to breathe new life into this approach to moral objectivity after it has recently fallen into disrepute. To this end, I will first engage with the sceptics: those who deny that thick concepts can shed light on moral objectivity, or indeed on anything of philosophical significance. The group I have in mind are so-called deflationists about the thick who deny the inherent normativity of thick concepts. On their view, the meaning of thick concepts is purely descriptive. Accordingly, for them, these concepts are just as incapable of bridging the is-ought gap as any other descriptive concept would be. To counter this scepticism, I will scrutinize and criticize some of the main arguments that deflationists have put forward. I expect that, in addition to re-establishing the inherent normativity of thick concepts, this critical discussion might yield certain desiderata that a satisfactory non-deflationary account of thick concepts should satisfy. If I am right, then the next step would consist in evaluating various existing non-deflationary accounts of thick concepts and of how they combine the two aspects of their meaning on the basis of how well these accounts satisfy the above-mentioned desiderata. My hypothesis is that an inferentialist account will do best.