Engineering for Institutional Design : Building up a new field
Engineering for Institutional Design : Building up a new field
批准号:
16203012
负责人:
SAIJO Tatsuyoshi
金额:
$27.21万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
日本
项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
财政年份:
2004
资助国家:
日本
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2004 至 2007
中文摘要
点击翻译按钮获取中文摘要
英文摘要
Engineering for Institutional Design is intended to develop a new field that aims at designing "real" and "robust" mechanisms or institutions using theory, experiment and survey. We propose a new concept called Secure Implementation as a fundamental framework for institutional design. Theorists usually presume behavioral principles at their own discretion. However, we cannot predetermine the principles of human behaviors. For this reason, we allow them to behave and choose from Nash to dominant strategies. One of the most famous mechanisms in the provision of public good is the Pivotal mechanism that is not securely implementable. We use human subjects to check out the performance between secure and non-secure mechanisms and find that the performance of secure mechanisms are significantly better than the Pivotal mechanism's one.Our "Are Japanese Spiteful?" project is to understand human behavior beyond the traditional selfish individual framework. When a public good is non-excludable, we prove that it is impossible to design a mechanism in which everyone has incentive to participate. We conduct experiments using Japanese, Chinese and American subjects and find that Japanese are spiteful in the following sense. Some Japanese subjects do not care about losing a little amount of payoff if it is possible that the other subjects lose quite a large amount of payoff. We name this as spiteful behavior. Furthermore, we find that human brain does not respond well to spiteful behavior, but respond quite well to altruistic behavior using fMRI. We also conjecture that spiteful behavior would be one of the fundamental human behaviors.We also conduct survey of environmental consciousness using Shanghai people. We find that elder people care about environment relative to younger people. This finding is rather different from the previous literature. Furthermore, we identify the strategies when a game is repeated finitely from both theoretical and experimental methods.
期刊论文(90)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
登录
查看更多内容
理論→実験→ニューロ:日本人はいじわるがお好き?
理论→实验→神经:日本人喜欢乱搞吗?
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2006
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Suzaki, Hiroshi, Kitamura, Masashi, Saito, Maki, Toda, Gyo, 西條辰義]
通讯作者:
西條辰義
"Elficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication"
“通过沟通进行重复拍卖的高效共谋”
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2006
期刊:
Journal of Economic Theory (掲載予定)
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Marlene Dyrloev Madsen, Henning Boje Andersen, Kenji Itoh, Masaki Aoyagi]
通讯作者:
Masaki Aoyagi
"A Four Country Comparison of Spite, Cooperation and Errors in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms"
《四个国家自愿捐款机制的恶意、合作与失误比较》
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2004
期刊:
Public Choice 119(3-4)
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Jordi Brandts, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Arthur Schram]
通讯作者:
Arthur Schram
Optimal Sales Scheme Against Interdependent Buyers
针对相互依赖买家的最优销售方案
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2007
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
[洲崎博史, 北村雅史, 齊藤真紀, 戸田暁, 村岡 啓一, 加藤博, 津谷 典子, Masaki Aoyagi]
通讯作者:
Masaki Aoyagi
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2007
期刊:
Theorerical Economics Vol.2(3)
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Saijo, T., T. Sjostrom, and T. Yamato]
通讯作者:
and T. Yamato
共 46 条
Designing Greenhouse Gases Emissions Trading Institutions : Theory and Experiments
-
批准号:11430002
-
项目类别:Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
-
资助金额:$7.74万
-
财政年份:1999
-
负责人:SAIJO Tatsuyoshi
-
依托单位:
Toward a modelling of public goods provision : theory and experiment
-
批准号:08453001
-
项目类别:Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
-
资助金额:$2.69万
-
财政年份:1996
-
负责人:SAIJO Tatsuyoshi
-
依托单位:
Analysis of Funding and Expenditure for Social Capital Enhancement : An Experimental Economics Approach
-
批准号:04451111
-
项目类别:Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research (B)
-
资助金额:$4.42万
-
财政年份:1992
-
负责人:SAIJO Tatsuyoshi
-
依托单位:
海外基金