The effecitiveness of the unanimity rule with sequential voting when jurors are unfair.
The effecitiveness of the unanimity rule with sequential voting when jurors are unfair.
批准号:
23830087
负责人:
ADACHI Tsuyoshi
金额:
$1.16万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
日本
项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
财政年份:
2011
资助国家:
日本
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2011 至 2012
中文摘要
我们分析了评审团必须对一组参赛者(例如体操比赛或手工艺竞技表演)进行排名的问题,这些参赛者的社会最优排名是陪审员中的常识。他们可能在参赛者中有朋友,因此可能偏向于他们的朋友。结果表明,采用公开投票的顺序投票代替无记名投票,作为陪审团的集体决策方法,可以有效地使陪审团选择出社会最优的排名。
英文摘要
We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants (e.g., gymnastics competitions or competitive shows of crafts) whose the socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors. They may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show that sequential voting with open ballot instead of secret ballot, is effective as the jury's collective decision-making method to make the jury select the socially optimal ranking.
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Natural implementation in scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites
当陪审员有最爱时,奖学金分配问题的自然实施
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2011
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Adachi, T., Tsuyoshi Adachi, Tsuyoshi Adachi, Tsuyoshi Adachi, Tsuyoshi Adachi]
通讯作者:
Tsuyoshi Adachi
A natural mechanism for scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites
当陪审员有偏爱时奖学金分配问题的自然机制
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2011
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Adachi, T., Tsuyoshi Adachi, Tsuyoshi Adachi]
通讯作者:
Tsuyoshi Adachi
A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
当陪审员有最爱时,自然产生排名的机制
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2012
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Adachi, T.]
通讯作者:
T.
A natural mechanism for scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favoritesand Applications
当陪审员有最爱和申请时,奖学金分配问题的自然机制
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2011
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Adachi, T., Tsuyoshi Adachi, Tsuyoshi Adachi, Tsuyoshi Adachi]
通讯作者:
Tsuyoshi Adachi