Schellings Idea of Man. The Philosophy of Identity between Idealism and Spinozism.

这个项目旨在解释谢林的人的理论在他的接受斯宾诺莎的背景下。我们的出发点将是提供一个全面的解释谢林的所谓的“维尔茨堡系统”从1804年，这是他的同一性哲学的中心文本，这是令人惊讶的是，在次要文献很少受到关注。其目的将是显示，在这篇文章中第一次，谢林的人的理解成为基础的替代哲学和批判的主体性理论，在康德和费希特发展。因此，我们将以一种历史的和系统的方式呈现哲学人类学的发展，因为它是作为对主体性理论的回应而出现的。研究假设是，理解斯宾诺莎的影响和他的身体与心灵之间的同一性概念，将使我们能够把握谢林的哲学在多大程度上反对人道主义和道德理论的人，以及如何表达自发性的想法取代了主体性理论。受斯宾诺莎的启发，谢林的人的理论可以被理解为试图重建生活的社会维度，在他看来，生活的社会维度已经溶解在现代性中，需要被赋予一种新的有机形式。从这个角度来看，主体性理论只是这种丧失的症状，谢林的目标不仅是提供一个新的和连贯的人与自然的概念，而且还包括科学，艺术，宗教，最后是国家。最终，这种旨在消除现代性病态的全面的哲学政治是所谓的身份哲学的核心。反过来说，这样一来，我们就可以清楚地看到，这种哲学体系并不是建立在一个匿名的、超越的上帝或绝对的基础上，而是建立在人作为一种不可分割的力量来发展对整个现实的看法的观念上。但这意味着，作为整体的实在只存在于所有观点的观点（或所有观念的观念）的不可分割的力量中，也就是说，存在于人中。换句话说，正是这种关于人的观念赋予了同一性哲学以统一性和连贯性。但这需要以一种非常仔细和微妙的方式来证明，因为它质疑和不同意自1801年首次出现以来对谢林恒等式系统的所有解释。我们的假设是，在他的维尔茨堡体系中，谢林证明了他是一个多样性和透视性的哲学家，直到今天才被认识到。这就提出了一个问题，使这项研究具有现实性和重要性：一个哲学人类学需要有多反拟人？

This project seeks to explain Schelling’s theory of man in the context of his reception of Spinoza. Our starting point will be to provide a comprehensive interpretation of Schelling’s so-called "Würzburger System" from 1804, which is the central text of his philosophy of identity and which has surprisingly received very little attention in the secondary literature. The aim will be to show how, in this text for the first time, Schelling’s understanding of man becomes the foundation for an alternative philosophy and critique of the theory of subjectivity developed in Kant and Fichte. Thus, we will present the development of philosophical anthropology in an historical and systematic way as it emerges as a response to a theory of subjectivity. The research hypothesis is that understanding the influence of Spinoza and his conception of the identity between body and mind, will enable us to grasp the extent to which Schelling’s philosophy is opposed to humanistic and moral theories of man and how the idea of expressive spontaneity substitutes a theory of subjectivity. Inspired by Spinoza, Schelling’s theory of man is thus to be understood as an attempt to reconstitute the social dimension of life, which in his view has been dissolved in Modernity and needs to be given a new organic form. From this point of view, theories of subjectivity are just symptoms of this loss, and Schelling’s aim is to provide not only a new and coherent conception of man and nature, but also of science, art, religion and finally of the state. Ultimately, this comprehensive ʼpolitics of philosophy῾ whose goal is to revoke the pathologies of Modernity is the core of the so called philosophy of identity. Conversely, what becomes clear in this way is that this philosophical system is not based on an anonymous Entirety, transcendent God or the Absolute, but on the idea of man as an immanent power to develop perspectives of reality as a whole. But this means that reality as a whole exists only in the immanent power of the perspective of all perspectives (or the ideas of all ideas) - that is to say: in man. In other words: it is this very conception of man that gives the philosophy of identity its unity and coherence. But this needs to be proved in a very careful and nuanced way, for it questions and disagrees with all the interpretations of Schelling’s identity system since it first appeared in 1801. Our hypothesis is that in his Würzburger System, Schelling proves to be a philosopher of diversity and perspectivity which was hardly been recognized until today. And this raises the question which gives this study its actuality and importance: how anti-anthropomorpic does a philosophical anthropology need to be?