Lobbying Across Multiple Levels: German Federal Institutions, European Union, and the Länder

拟议的研究项目调查有组织的利益如何协调他们的政治活动在不同层次的多层次系统。调查立法游说的商业利益集团，协会代表分散的利益，和公司，这些有组织的利益被概念化为理性的行为者。应用竞技场框架共同的研究单位，我们认为宣传路线超越了两个主要路线-国家和布鲁塞尔路线-即使重点是立法，国家决策者有法律的管辖权。基于资源依赖和交换理论的观点，我们确定额外的路线，将位于国家一级的冲突的背景下，除非和直到一个或多个演员成功地重新路由这一冲突到欧盟或次国家竞技场。如果一个利益集团未能克服国家动员对其偏好的偏见，它可能会扩大冲突，例如，欧盟层面，以弥补国家对其需求缺乏响应的情况。一旦一项欧盟立法回到国家竞技场，其内容可能与国家政府所希望的不同。在这种情况下，利益集团寻求首先通过布鲁塞尔路线在国家一级执行其议程和/或规避冲突，目的是在立法进入国家转化或执行进程之前影响其实质内容。在实证方面，我们将分析研究单位共同的50项立法建议的子样本。分析的主要单位是德国多级政府体制背景下的利益组织。这些情况将因政策领域及其在三级政府中的影响范围而异，以确定利益集团何时、何地以及如何活跃起来。实证分析包括两个主要组成部分：（a）识别和测量的群体行为在这些级别的子样本的研究单位的一套立法建议（在合作P1），和（B）三个详细的案例研究的战略选择的利益集团在导航的多层次系统。研究结果将有助于更深入的见解，研究国家以下游说和游说在联邦系统，在欧洲的多层次系统的游说文学，以及研究的场地选择和竞技场进入。

The proposed research project investigates how organized interests coordinate their political activities across different levels of multilevel systems. Investigating legislative lobbying by business interest groups, associations representing diffuse interests, and firms, these organized interests are conceptualized as rational actors. Applying the arena framework common to the research unit, we consider routes of advocacy beyond the two principal routes – the national and the Brussels route – even when the focus is on legislation over which national policymakers have legal jurisdiction. Based on resource dependence and exchange theoretical perspectives, we identify additional routes in the context of conflicts that would be located at the national level unless and until one or more actors succeed in re-routing this conflict to the EU or subnational arena. If an interest group fails to overcome a national mobilization bias against its preferences, it can expand the conflict to, e.g., the EU level to compensate for the lack of national responsiveness to its needs. Once a piece of EU legislation returns to the national arena, its content likely differs from what the national government would have favored. Under these circumstances, interest groups seek to carry their agendas and/or circumvent conflict at the national level via the Brussels route first, aiming to influence its substance before the legislation reaches the national transposition or implementation process. Empirically, we will analyze a subsample of the 50 legislative proposals common to the research unit. The main unit of analysis is the interest organization in the context of the German multilevel system of government. The cases will vary with respect to policy area and their reach across the three levels of government to identify when, where, and how interest groups become active. The empirical analysis consists of two major components: (a) the identification and measurement of group behavior across these levels for a subsample of the research unit’s set of legislative proposals (in cooperation with P1), and (b) three detailed case studies on the strategic choices made by interest groups in navigating the multilevel system. The findings will contribute deeper insights to research on subnational lobbying and lobbying in federal systems, the literature on lobbying in the multilevel system of Europe, and research on venue choice and arena entry.