Juridical sociologies. Law and society from 1814 to the 1920s

为什么法律这个话题在社会学出现时就扮演了核心角色？为什么今天的情况不再是这样了？本文通过对19世纪初以来私法法学与社会学相互参照的谱系考察，解释了社会学对法律的兴趣的这种转变。正是在私法法学中，德国历史学派发展了对法律与社会关系问题化的方法，它不仅涉及法律的理论，而且涉及法律的教义学和方法论。在此基础上，通过对法律的话语的处置性分析，可以发现三种问题化的方式：德国历史学派之争中的“表征处置性”，即法律在社会的充分表征问题上被问题化;关于《民法典》社会任务的争论中的“功能的处置”，其中法律对社会的调节功能受到威胁;最后是世纪初方法之争中的“规范性处置”，其中如何科学地证实司法判决中的规范性评价的问题导致了法理学，特别是法律与社会关系问题化的这三种模式在社会学中找到了出路，它出现了，正如可以在埃米尔·涂尔干，马克斯·韦伯和费迪南德·滕尼斯的社会学项目中看到的那样。他们都关注于确定法律与社会关系的一种可能性：类似于“表征的决定性”，涂尔干在法律中承认集体意识，滕尼斯关注法律的秩序功能，他的社会学最终发展了一种针对“社会问题”的新的法哲学;韦伯可以被分配到“规范性的决定性”，因为在他所有的方法论著作中，他都在与法律的科学的认识论关系作斗争。接近法律的话语-涂尔干的“法律社会学”，Tönnies和Weber -导致社会学和法学之间的分离的必要性。在他们的结论中，这三位作者在审慎处置中进行了转变，最终导致了社会学法律的丧失。这种历史研究确定了法律与社会之间关系问题化的一个点，在这个点上，人们可以进行干预，以便使法律再次成为社会学的目标。

Why did the topic of law play a central role in sociology as it emerged? And why is this no longer the case today? The present study explains this transformation of the sociological interest in law by means of a genealogical investigation of the mutual references of the jurisprudence of private law and sociology, starting from the beginning of the 19th century.It was precisely in the jurisprudence of private law that the German Historical School developed ways of problematizing the relationship between law and society, which concerns not only legal theory but also legal dogmatics and methodology. On this basis, a dispositive analysis of legal discourses can be used to work out three such ways of problematizing: the ‘dispositive of representation’ in the debates about the German Historical School, in which law is problematized over the question of the adequate representation of society; the ‘dispositive of function' in the dispute about the social task of the Civil Code (BGB), in which the regulatory function of law vis-à-vis society is at stake; and finally, the 'normative dispositive' in the dispute over methods at the beginning of the 20th century, in which the question of how the normative evaluation in judicial judgments can be scientifically substantiated leads to a divorce between jurisprudence and, in particular, sociology on the difference between ‘ought’ and 'is'.These three modes of problematization of the relation between law and society find their way into sociology as it emerges, as can be seen paradigmatically in the sociological projects of Émile Durkheim, Max Weber and Ferdinand Tönnies. Each of them focuses on one possibility of determining the relationship between law and society: analogous to the ‘dispositive of representation’, Durkheim recognizes in law the collective consciousness; Tönnies focuses on the ordering function of law, and his sociology ends up by developing a new philosophy of law in view of the 'social question'; Weber can be assigned to the ‘dispositive of normativity’, since in all his methodological writings he struggles with the epistemological relationship to legal science.The proximity to legal discourses - the 'juridical sociologies' of Durkheim, Tönnies and Weber - results in the necessity of a separation between sociology and jurisprudence. In their conclusions, these three authors make shifts within the jurisprudential dispositives which ultimately lead to the loss of law for sociology. This historical study identifies the point in the problematization of the relationship between law and society at which one can intervene in order to make law addressable again for sociology.