Contemporary Issues on the Regulation against Abuse of A Dominant Bargaining Position

许多人认为，反对滥用谈判支配地位的规则是独特的日本式规则。首先，在谈判中处于支配地位并不意味着在市场中处于支配地位。它包含了交易关系特定情境下的不对称议价能力。其次，滥用行为并不等于反竞争行为。它包含剥削行为。曾经，我们对谈判中的优势地位没有任何理论解释。最近一些经济学家将其解释为套牢问题或后契约机会主义。在这个研究项目中，我们接受这个观点。但我们坚持认为，该规定是为了保护有限理性当事人的合理预期。通常情况下，谈判支配地位是指缔约双方之间的谈判能力，但它包含了市场支配地位。为了从这个角度分析一种支配性的谈判地位，我阐述了一种市场势力分析方法。第二，本文认为滥用行为应包括剥削性和排他性两种类型。一些虐待行为具有这两种特征。因此，我们应当同时接受这两种观点，以便对滥用市场支配地位行为进行适当的规制。

Many people say that the Regulation against abuse of a dominant bargaining position is unique Japanese-style Regulation. In the first place, a dominant bargaining position dose not mean a dominant position in a market. It contains asymmetric bargaining power caused by the transaction-relationship specific situations. In the second place, abusive conducts dose not mean anti-competitive conduct. It contains exploitive conduct. At one time, we had no theoretical explanation for a dominant bargaining position. Recently some economist explains it as a case of hold-up problem or post-contractual opportunism. In this research project, we accept this perspective. But we insist that the regulation works for the protection of the reasonable expectations of bounded rational parties. Usually a dominant bargaining position means a bargaining power between contracting parties, but it contains dominant position in the market. In order to analyse a dominant bargaining position in this perspective, I elaborate a method of market power analysis. For the second place, I shows that the abuse should contain both exploitive and exclusive. Some abusive practice have both traits. So we should accept both perspective in order to regulate abuse of a dominant position properly.