Strategy-proof rules in the international Society

我们研究了国际社会中国际上拥有的资源在国家之间分配的非战略性分配规则。我们研究了两种环境下的分配规则。一种环境是资源是完全可分割的，国家具有非单调偏好。一种环境是资源完全可分割，国家具有非单调偏好。在这种环境下，我们分析了统一规则(Bennasy，1982)。我们证明了：i)一致规则是满足最小富域上防策略性、有效性和对称性的唯一规则；ii)满足防策略性、有效性和对称性的最大域是唯一的，它是单板域；另一个环境是资源不可分，但金钱补偿是可能的。在这种环境下，我们分析了Vickrey分配规则。我们证明了Viclrey分配规则是一种独特的策略规则--防伪性、匿名性和个体理性。

We studied strategy-proof allocation rules in the international society where internationally held resource are allocated among counties. We studied allocation rules in two environment. One environment is such that the resource is perfectly divisible and countries have nonmonotonic preferences.One environment is such that the resource is perfectly divisible and countries have nonmonotonic preferences. In this environment, we analyzed the uniform rule (Bennasy, 1982). We established that i)the uniform rule is a unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry on a minimally rich domain, and that ii)the maximal domain on which rules satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry is unique, and it is the signle-plateued domain.The other environment is such that the resource is not divisible, but monetary compensation is possible. In this environment, we analyzed the Vickrey allocation rule. We established that the Viclrey allocation rule is a unique rule saysfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality.