The Mechanism and Stability of Global Imbalances

我们建立了一个博弈论模型，两个超级大国竞相吸引小国成为其俱乐部的成员。超级大国玩着一个两阶段的顺序博弈(Stackelberg博弈)，为他们提供的俱乐部商品选择一个意识形态位置。俱乐部商品具有消费外部性，即每个成员支付的价格取决于加入俱乐部的其他成员，因为成员分担成本。为了模拟超级大国与其他国家之间的双向互动，我们使用联盟形成过程(CORE)来确定小国在每个阶段的行为，并推导出两个超级大国之间博弈的子博弈完美纳什均衡。我们模拟我们的游戏来描述美国和中国是如何争夺势力范围的。

We build a game-theoretic model of two superpowers competing to attract small countries as members for their clubs. The superpowers play a two stage sequential game (Stackelberg game) of choosing an ideological location for club goods they provide. The club goods have consumption externalities, i.e., the price which each member pays depends on others who join the club as members share the cost. To model the two-way interaction between superpowers and the other countries we usea coallition formation process (core) to determine the behavior of the small countries in each stage and derive the subgame perfect Nash equilbrium of the game between the two superpowers. We simulate our game to characterize how the US and China compete for a sphere of influence.