Japanese Corporate Finance in the Light of Recent Developments in Principal Agent Problems

在一个多边委托代理问题模型中，管理者通过发行股票和从银行借钱为项目融资，对战后日本公司融资的典型事实进行了解释和分析。我们发现，在一个两期模型中，银行和股东的长期承诺均衡出现了以下特征：(1)银行持有股份以最优地选择经理的报酬计划；(2)将对经理的监督和干预职能委托给银行；(3)解雇经理作为支配破产选择权的一种纪律手段。这些特征与1950年至1970年代中期日本经济的典型事实大体一致。

Stylized facts of corporate finance in the postwar Japan are interpreted and analyzed in a model of multi-lateral principal agent problem, wherein managers finance the project by issuing stocks as well as borrowing money from banks. We show that, in a two period model, the following features arise as the equilibrium with longterm commitments by banks and stockholders: (1) share holdings by banks to optimally choose the reward schedule for the manager, (2) delegation of minitoring as well as intervening functions against the management to the bank, and (3) dismissal of the manager as a discipline device which dominates the bankruptcy option. These features are in broad accordance with the stylized facts of the Japanese economy from 1950 through mid-1970s.